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This thesis is intended to becone a portion of the textbook
utili2€d in the coarse entitled "Warheads and Lethality"
(AE-3705). This portion of the text includes an unclassi-
fied discussion of a target's susceptibility to an exter-
nally detonating HE warhead and a target's vulnerability.
In particular, the section on target susceptibility leads to
the development of the number of fragments which strike a
target aircraft from an externally detonating warhead. The
section on target vulnerability explains the methodology
used for identifying critical components and conducting a
vulnerability assessient, and leads to the effects of frag-
ments and penetrators striking an aircraft.
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I. SUSCEPTIBILITY TO EXTERHAIIY DETONATING FRAGMENIAIION
WABHIipS
A. IBTECDDCTIOl
Susceptibility refers to the inability of a target to
avoid being damaged in the pursuit of its mission. For
aircraft, susceptibility to an externally detonating warhead
refers to an aircraft's probability of being hit.
Susceptibility, like vulnerability, is good. The level or
degree of susceptibility of an aircraft in a e encounter with
a threat is dependent upon three major factors, the
encounter scenario, the threat, and the aircraft. The
encounter scenario includes the missile and aircraft posi-
tions, velocity vectors, respective attitudes, a determina-
tion of the warhead's fragment dynamic spray angles, a
deternination of the missile miss distance, and the determi-
nation of how many fragments or penetrators strike the
aircraft. The important features of the threat are its
characteristics, its operations, and its lethality. The
important aircraft features are the aircraft detectable
signatures, countermeasures, performance capabilities, and
self-protection armanent.
B- ENCCDNTEH SCEHABIC
Tie encounter scenario takes into account the missile's
flight path and the target's flight path to allow calcula-
tion of the missile liss distarce, fragment miss distance,
the warhead's dynamic fragment spray angles and velocities,
and the number of fragments which strike the target.
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1 . Warhead Dynaniic Sgra^ Angles and Velocities
When a warhead detonates in the vicinity of an
aircraft, the fragments or pecetrators are usually ejected
uniformly around the missile axis and propagate outward in a
divergent spherical- like spray pattern at a velocity that is
the vector sum of the initial fragment ejection velocity
from a static warhead detonation and the missile velocity.
The fragment at the front of the warhead is assumed to
propagate outward at the leading spray angle, and the frag-
ment at the tail end of the warhead is assumed to propagate
along trajectory at the trailing spray angle. All other
fragment trajectories lie between these two spray angles and
constitute the fragment spray. As the aircraft moves in
space, the fragments propagate outward and eventually some
of the fragments may strike the aircraft. Whether or not
any of the fragments strike the aircraft and where they hit
depend upon the relative positions, velocities, and the
attitude of the warhead and the aircraft at the time of
detonation (encounter conditions) and the fragment static
velocities and static spray angles. A sample warhead
depicting static fragment spray angles and velocities, and
dynamic fragment spray angles and velocities is depicted in
Figure 1.1. Osing the law of cosines and Figure 1.1, the
dynamic fragment velocity, V^^ , is given by:
\^ = V^ * ^s^ - (2 X V^ X V^ X Cos 3 ) (1.1)
where V is the missile velocity and V is the static fraq-
m ' s
ment velocity. Since the angle 3 is not known. Equation 1- 1
must be rearranged to use the only known angle, which is the
static fragment spray angle, a . Rearranging Equation 1.1,
the dynamic fragment velocity is given by:
V.2 =V2+v2-£2xV XV X Cos(180-a.)] (1.2)





























Again referring to Figure 1.1, the dynamic fragment velocity
may te written in vector notation as:
^i = C^m * (^s X Ccsa.) ]i + [^s X Sina.Jj (1.3)
Solvirg Eguation 1.3 for the djnamic fragment spray angle,
(f). ,
yields:
0i = Tan-i[ (V3 X Sinai) / l\ * (\ ^ Cosol) ]] (1.4)
Now that the dynamic fragment spray angles and velocities
are known, the fragment spray density may be determined.
2 . Fragment S£r a_j Density
Ihe damage inflicted or an aircraft depends on the
number and the location of the fragment impacts, and on the
terminal effects parameters such as the fragment mass and
impact velocity. For this derivation of the fragment spray
density, the following assumptions are made:
1. The fragments lie on a spherical segment whose center
is at the center of the warhead.
2. The fragments emerge from the warhead in such a way
that they remain on the surface of an expanding sphere.
An encounter scenario with a horizontally moving aircraft,
and based on the assumptions stated above, is depicted in
Figure 1.2.
For any given fragment spray zone, the density of
fragments within that zone is simply the number of fragments
contained in the zone divided by the surface area of the
sphere contained within the conical angles defining the
zone. The average rumber of fragments per unit area of
fragment spray, known as the fragment spray density
, p , is
given by Eguation 1-5.
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Figure 1.2 Sample Encounter with a Horizontally Moving
Aircraft Depicting the Fragaent Spray Density
15
p = N / A (1.5)
vhere N is the total number of fragments in the warhead and
A is the area the fragments are spread over. Referring to
Figure 1.2, the area. A, is given by:
A = 2xiTx) (sxSin<|))xsd(t> (1.6)
Solving Equation 1.6 leads to tie solution:
A = 2x TTxs^x (Cos \ - Czs <^2) (1-7)
Substituting Equation 1.7 into Equation 1.5 yields the frag-
ment spray density at some distance s from the detonation
point
:
p=N/[2x 7Txs2x (Cos 4)1 - Cos (|^ ) ] (1.8)
where the leading and trailing dynamic fragment spray angles
are defined, with respect to the warhead axis, by Equation
1.4.
3. Missile Miss Eistanc e
Eor the calculation of nissile miss distance, it is
assumed that the encounter is tvo dimensional, and that the
target's velocity and the missile's velocity remain
constant. Two approaches to calculate the miss distance
will he presented. The first approach is the global
approach.
a. Global Approach
Figure 1.3 depicts a typical encounter situation. Figure
1.U depicts the same encounter situation using vector nota-
tion. Referring to Figure 1.4, and using vector addition,




















































Eearranging Equation 1.9 and solving for "i leads to:
s = (T - M) + (t - m) (1-10)
The initial conditions (at time t = 0) are given by
Equations 1.11 and 1.12. The conditions at some later time
(t = T ) are given by Equations 1.13 and 1.14.
T = (T^)i + (T^):' (1. 11)
M = (M ) 1 + (M )'j^ (1. 12)
t = (V^ X T )
T
(1. 13)
= (V X T X Cose )i+(V XTXSine)j (1.14)
" mm
Substituting these conditions back into Equation 1.10 gives:
i = [ (T^ - H^)i + (T^ - M^)T] + [ ((V^ X T) (1.15)
- (V X T X Cos 9 ) )'i - (V X T X Sin ) j ]™
mm
Eearranging Equation 1.15 and combining similar components
gives:
i = [ (T - M ) + [ X (V - (V X Cos e )) j]i (1.16)
+ [ (T - M ) - (7 X T X Sin e ) ]j
y y m
The missile miss distance is given by taking the magnitude
of Equation 1.16 which is:
I
s j = [ (T^ - M^) + [ T X (V - (7 X Cos e ) ) ] ]2
+ [ (Ty - M^) - (V^ X T X Sine ) ]2
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Of interest is the minimuin miss distance. Taking the deriv-
ative of Equation 1.17 with respect to t, and setting it
equal to zero yields:
C {{T - Ml X {V - {V X Cos 9)}) - {(T - M ) (1. 18)
X (V X Sin ) } ] + [ 1
m
+ (Vn, X Sin 9) 2]] =
9 T X [ {V - (V x Cos 9 ) } 2
t m
Solving Equation 1.18 for t yields t for the minimum miss
distance which is:
= [ ((T^ - fl^) X V X Sin 9) + ((T - M ) (1.19)
X V X Cos 9) - ({T - M ) X 7 ) ] /
m X X t
[ (Vt - (V^ X COS 9 ) ) 2 + (V^ X Sin 9 ) 2 ]
The minimum missile miss distacce is then given by substi-
tuting the value of t , obtained from Equation 1.19, into
Equation 1 . 17.
b. Local Approach
The local approach is an alternative approach to the one
described above. In the local approach, the target remains
stationary and the target's velocity vector is superimposed
on the missile's velocity vector. This geometry is depicted
in Figure 1.5. From Figure 1.5, the velocity of the missile
with the target's velocity superimposed, V^^^^
,
becomes:
V . = (V X Cos 9)1 + (V X Sin 6) j - (V.)T (1.20)
m m
Rearranging Equation 1.20 into a more suitable form gives:






























The derivation of tie minimui nissile miss distance in the
local system follows the same procedure as for the glotal
system, and since it leads to the same result as given by
Equation 1.17, the derivation will not be repeated.
From the geometry of Figure 1. 5, it is possible
to determine if the missile will be a "late bird" or an
"early bird". An "early bird" is where the closest point of
approach (CPA) of the missile is in front of the target in
the local system. A "late bird" is where the CPA of the
missile is behind the target. This relationship may be
determined graphically with the use of the following
formula
:
'e = Tan-i [ (Vjj, X Sine ) / [ (V^^ x Cose ) - V^ ] ] (1.22)
Now that the missile miss distance has been
calculated, and knowing the fragment spray density, a deter-
mination must be made as to whether or not the fragments hit
the target, and if so, how many fragments strike the target.
To accomplish this, the fragment miss distance must be
determined.
^ • Z^§Sl^Iil lLi§^ Dista nce
As was the case for missile miss distance, the frag-
ment miss distance may be derived in either a global coordi-
nate system or in a local coordinate system. Figure 1.6
depicts the fragment iriss distaice for the global coordinate
system, and Figure 1.7 depicts the miss distance for the
global system using vector notation. Figure 1.8 depicts the
fragment miss distance in the local coordinate system. The
derivation of the fragment miss distance in a global coordi-
nate system follows. Referrirg to Figure 1.7, and using





























































































c = (T - F) + (t - f) (1.23)
The initial conditiocs are given by Equations 1.2U and 1.25.
The conditions at scire later time (t = '^ ) are given by
Equations 1.26 and 1.27.
1 = (T^)T + (T ) j' (1.24)
y
F = (Fx)i + (Fy) j" (1.25)
t = (Vt X T )'i (1.26)
f = (V^ X T X Cosy)'i + (V^ J T X SinY)3^ (1.27)
Substituting these conditions tack into Equation 1.23, and
solving for c, leads to:
c = [ (Tx - F^) - ( T X {(V. X Cos y ) - V^)) ]i (1.28)
[ (Ty - Fy) - ( T X Vi X Sin y ) ]J
The magnitude of Equation 1.28 is:
|c| = [ (T^ - F^) - IT X ((V. X Cos y) - V^)} ]2 (1.29)
+ [(T^ -Fy) - ( T X V. X Sin y) ]2
To find the minimum fragment miss distance, t for the
minimum miss distance is needed. Taking the derivative cf
Equation 1.29 with respect to t , and setting it equal to
zero yields:
T = [ { (T^ - F^) X 1(V. X Cos y) - V^}} + (1.30)
{(Ty - Fy) X V. X Sin y} ] / [ ((V X Cos y) - V ) 2
+ (V. X Sin y) 2]
1
26
To find the rainimum fragment niss distance, simply solve
Equation 1.30 for t , and substitute that value of t into
Equation 1.29. This derivation assumed that the fragment
velocity was constant. If the fragment velocity is not
constant, or reasonatly so, then f is given by:
f = / [ (7. X Cos Y )i + (V. X Sin y ) j ] ^
^
^
Solving Equation 1.3 1 gives:
r
f = [ (Cos Y ) i + {SinY)j] x J Vi ( t ) di
(1.31)
(1.32)
Now that the fragment miss distance has been calculated, the
number of fragments which strike the target will be
determined.
5 • Fragment I m^act s on th e Target
The number of hits. on the aircraft presented
area at the aspect under consideration, A , is given by:
n = p X
^
(1.33)
where p is the fragment spray density defined by Equation
1.8. Figure 1.9 depicts the fragment spray density striking
an aircraft in the local coordinate system described
earlier, where f ^ and f2 represent the leading edge and
trailing edge fragment vectors, respectively. The angle "y
is defined as:
/>rf
y = Tan-» [(V. X Siny ) / { (1. x Cosy ) - V )] (1-34)
1 i 1 i t
Figure 1.10 depicts the same geometry in the global coordi-
nate system described earlier. Recall from Equation 1.8























aircraft, H , is needed and not F^ . The time from detona-
tion to fragment impact in the global system is:
t = E / V. (1.35)
The time from detonation to fragment impact in the local
system is:
t = Edet / Vft (1-36)
where V
^^
is defined as follovs:
v^^ 2 = [ (V. X Cosy ) - V ]2 + [V. X Siny ]2 (1.37)
Equating Equation 1.35 to Equation 1.36, and solving for R
yields:
R2 = R 2 / [ 1 - (2 X (V /V ) X Cosy ) (1.38)
+ (V^/V.)2]
where 7 is the target velocity and V. is the dynamic frag-
ment velocity as defined by Equation 1.2. The extent of the
fragment spray which strikes the aircraft, and the number
and location of fragment hits, are dependent upon the
encounter conditions. Figure 1.11 depicts the effects of
varying the detonaticr distance to the target. In zone 1,
the full fragment spray hits the target. In zone 2, all of
the target is hit by part of the fragment spray. In zones 3
and U, part of the fragment Sfray hits part of the target.
In zone 1, with the target hit by the full fragment sfray,
the presented area of the aircraft may be determined as
follows. Figure 1.12 depicts a frontal view of the fragment
spray striking an aircraft. From Figure 1.12, the angle K































Figure 1.12 Frontal View of Fragments
Impacting an Aircraft
C = Tan-i [W / (2 X R X Sin (f) )] (1.39)
The circumferential length of tie spray zone is defined as:
b = 2x ^xRxSin (1.40)
where (^ is the dynamic fragment spray angle of the center
fragment. Substituting Equation 1.39 into Equation 1.40
yields:
b = 2 X R x Sin ^ x Tan-i [W / (2 x R x Sin ^ ) ] (1.41)
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The fragnent spray zcce covers a spherical area of:
Area = b x R x { 4>2 - *i ) (1.42)
Substituting Equation 1.42 into Equation 1.33 yields:
n= (Nxb) /[2x TT xRx (Cos <t>i - Cos (f>2 ) ] (1.^3)
which determines the number of fragments which strike the
aircraft in zone 1. The assunption has been made in this
estimation that the fragment spray covers the entire
presented area of the aircraft. If this is not the case, or
if only a portion of the spraj meridian hits a portion of
the aircraft (zones 2, 3, and 4 in Figure 1.11), A , in
Equation 1.33 must be reduced to the actual area that is
struck by fragments. The extent of the fragment spray which
does strike the aircraft, the number of fragment hits, the
fragment approach directions, and where the hits occur are
dependent upon the encounter ccnditions. For example, a
detonation directly below the center of the aircraft in a
head-on encounter will have a different result than from a
detonation in the sane place fcr a tail-chasing missile due
to the difference in the relative closing velocity.
Furthermore, changing the elevation angle of the missile at
the time of detonation will change the results. With the
number of fragments which strike the aircraft deternined,
the effects of fragments and penetrators striking an




Target vulnerability refers to the inability of a target
to withstand one or nore hits by damage mechanisms (frag-
ments, penetrators, incendiary particles, and blast) or a
target's liability to serious damage or destruction when hit
ty enemy fire. Aircraft that are more vulnerable are
softer, that is, they are more likely to be lost when hit.
Therefore, aircraft vulnerability is essentially a measure
of the toughness of an aircraft when all surviveability
measures have failed and the threat interacts with the
aircraft. From an air defense standpoint target vulner-
ability is good.
Each individual component cf an aircraft has a certain
level or amount of vulnerabilit j. Each component's vulner-
ability then contributes, in seme measure, to the overall
vulnerability of the aircraft. The critical components of
an aircraft are those components that are essential to the
functioning of a system, and if the component performance is
sufficiently degraded or if the component is rendered inop-
erative by combat damage, a target kill in some kill
category will result. The systematic description, delin-
eation, and quantification of the vulnerability of the indi-
vidual components and vulnerability of the total aircraft is
known as a vulnerability assessnent.
B. IDENTIEICATION OE CRITICAL COMPONENTS
The first step in a vulnerability assessment is the
identification of those comporents whose damage or loss
could lead to an aircraft kill, and they are referred to as
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critical components. This idertification process is called
critical component analysis. J\ component may be a critical
component because it provides an essential function such as
thrust, lift, or control. A component may also be a crit-
ical ccmponent because its mode of failure leads to the
failure of a critical component that does provide an essen-
tial function. For example, a fuel tank in a wing can be
perforated by a fragnent, causirg a slow fuel leak and even-
tual fuel depletion, with no substantial effect on the
continued operation cf the aircraft. In this situation, the
wing fuel tank is not a critical component. On the ether
hand, the fragment impact and penetration of the wing tank
could cause ignition cf the fuel vapor in the ullage, with a
subsequent fire or explosion and loss of the aircraft. In
this case, the wing tank is definitely a critical component.
A general procedure has been developed for determining
the critical components, their possible damage or failure
modes, and the effects of the component damage or failure
upon the continued operation cf the aircraft. This proce-
dure consists of: (1) a selection of the aircraft kill
levels or categories to be considered, (2) an assembly of
the technical and functional description of the aircraft,
and (3) the determination of the critical components of the
aircraft and their damage-caused failure modes for the
selected kill levels.
1 . Aircra ft Kil 1 Level s
To assess the vulnerability of both fixed wing and
rotary aircraft in-flight, four kill categories have been
defined. These kill categories are the Attrition Kill, the
Mission (Mission Abort) Kill, the Forced Landing Kill, and
the Mission Available Kill.
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a. AttritioE Kill
Attrition kill covers those aircraft with ccmtat
damage so extensive that it is neither reasonable nor
economical to repair. The attrition category is divided
into the six levels cf kill listed below.
(1) KK Kill. This level of kill is associated
with danage that will cause the aircraft to disintegrate
immediately upon being hit. This kill level is also
referred to as a Catastrophic Kill.
(2) K Kill. This level of kill is associated
with damage that will cause an aircraft to fall out of
manned control within 30 seconds after being hit.
(^) A Kill' This level of kill is associated
with damage that will cause an aircraft to fall out of
manned control within five minutes after being hit.
(^) 1 Kill- This level of kill is associated
with damage that will cause an aircraft to fall out of
manned control within 30 minutes after being hit.
(5) C Kill. This level of kill is associated
with damage that will cause an aircraft to fall out of
manned control before completeing its mission.
(6) E Kill. This level of kill is associated
with damage that will cause an aircraft to sustain addi-
tional levels of damage upon landing and makes it uneconom-
ical to repair as specified ty the applicable Technical
Orders, Technical Bulletins, anc regulations.
t. Mission (I«ission Abort) Kill
This category covers any aircraft with combat
damage that prevents the aircraft from completing its
mission. This is mission dependent and is divided into two
levels; mission abort and mission kill. Mission abort
covers aircraft which are not lost to inventory but cannot
36
complete their missicc. Missicn kill covers aircraft which
fall cut of manned ccntrol before completing their mission.
c. Forced Landing Kill
This category covers those aircraft with ccmtat
damage that forces the crew to execute a controlled landing
(powered or unpowered) . This category includes aircraft
with damage which will require repairs for flight to anctier
area and aircraft with damage which cannot be repaired on
site tut which can be recovered by a special team. This
category has been restricted mainly to rotary wing aircraft
which can land nearly anywhere either powered or by autoro-
tation. It is more difficult for a damaged fixed wing
aircraft to successfully execute a forced landing (and/or
subsecuent takeoff) since some prepared landing site is
generally required.
d. Mission Available Kill
This category covers those aircraft that have
landed with combat damage and will require repair before
returning to mission ready status. There are different
levels (intervals) for missicn availability. The interval
of time required to accomplish repairs is expressed in
elapsed time, total man-hours, cr combinations thereof.
2- Aircraft Descript ion
At the beginning of any vulnerability study, as much
as possible of the aircraft's technical and functional
description must be gathered on each of the major systems of
the aircraft. The aircraft's technical descriptior consists
of engineering data which docunents the physical and func-
tional relationships of the aircraft's subsystems. The
types of physical descriptions utilized are general aircraft
arrangement drawings such as three view and inboard
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profiles, installaticc drawings, and schematic diagrams for
the primary subsystens to include: airframe structure,
propulsion system, fuel system, flight control system,
pneumo-hydraulic system, aircrew, avionics system, and
weapon and delivery systems. The suitability and quantity
of data available to produce the necessary aircraft
descriptions are functions of the status of the system
withiE the acguisiticn or deployment phase. Aircraft tech-
nical descriptions should utilize all of the data base to
include: engineering scaled drawings, subsystem functional
descriptions, technical orders and manuals, and access to
design personnel.
3 • Critical Compcnent Analysis
A critical ccaponent is any component that is essen-
tial to the functioning of a sjstem, and if the component
performance is sufficiently degraded or if the component is
rendered inoperative hy combat damage, a target kill in some
kill category will result. Fcr example, the engine in a
single engine aircraft is a critical component for an A kill
because its loss would lead to an aircraft loss within five
minutes.
^hen two or more aircraft components are redundant,
such as two engines, the loss of any one of the redundant
components will not result in the loss of an essential func-
tion and hence, that component is not a critical component
according to the definition given above. This assumes that
the damage process and loss of one redundant component will
not lead to the loss cf any other redundant components. Por
example, if one engine of a tvin engine aircraft starts to
burn, the assumption is made that the fire will not spread
to the other engine and destroy it. If this were to happen,
there is no actual redundancy ard both engines are nonredun-
dant critical components. Since more than one hit can be
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expected in a typical threat encounter, it is possible that
all of the redundant components could be killed, leading to
an aircraft kill. Therefore, the fact that a component is
reduncant does not eliminate it as a critical component.
This requires that a distincticn between the two kinds of
critical components be made. In the past, nonredundant and
redundant critical components have been referred tc as
singly vulnerable components and multiply vulnerable compo-
nents, respectively. This terminology is confusing and will
not be used here. A given ccmponent may be nonredundant
with respect to a given kill category and redundant with
respect tc another kill category. For example, consider a
twin engine helicopter. If the loss of either engine causes
a mission abort, the engines are nonredundant for the
mission abort category. If the loss of both engines is
required to cause a crash or forced landing, the engines are
redundant for these two kill categories.
The first step in a critical component analysis is
to identify the flight and mission essential functions that
the aircraft must perform ir order to accomplish its
mission. The second step is the identification of the major
systems and subsystens that perform these essential func-
tions. The third step is tc conduct a Failure Mode and
Effects Analysis (FMEA) to identify the relationships
between each possible type cf individual component or
subsystem failure mode and the performance of the essential
functions. The Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is sometimes used
to provide additional insight into the identification of
critical components. The fourth step is to conduct a Damage
Modes and Effects Analysis (DMEA) . The DMEA relates compo-
nent or subsystem failure modes to combat-caused damage.
The combination of the third and fourth steps is referred to
as the Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis
(FMECA) . The last step in a critical component analysis is
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a visual presentaticE of the list of critical components
and/or a logical expression to identify the redundant and
nonredundant critical componerts for the selected kill
level. The visual presentation is referred to as a kill
tree and the logical expression is referred to as a kill
expression.
a. Flight and Mission Essential Functions
Flight essential furctions are those system and
subsystem functions required to enable an aircraft to
sustain controlled flight. Mission essential functions are
those system and subsystem functions required to enable an
aircraft to perform its designated mission. The analysis
should consider each phase of the mission. A typical
mission for an attack aircraft would include such phases as
takeoff^ climb to cruise altitude, cruise to attack area,
descent to attack altitude, target location, ordnance
delivery, egress from the target area, climb to cruise alti-
tude, return cruise, descent, and landing. The flight and
mission essential furctions should be identified and the
priority for possible protection established for each of
these phases. For example, the operation of the electronic
weapons computer during takeoff is not a flight essential
function, but it is a missicr. essential function during
ordnance delivery. A particular level of operation should
be identified for the flight essential functions such as
lift, thrust, and control. For example, loss of one engine
of a twin engine helicopter may not cause a total loss of
lift and thrust, but it will lead to a reduction of perform-
ance capabilities. This loss of performance may not be
acceptable in a hostile environment because the helicopter
would become an easy target. Therefore, the continued oper-
ation of both engines may be required to prevent an attri-
tion kill. Special functions must also be identified.
UO
These include special functions such as those required for
the vertical flight cf a VTOL aircraft or those required for
arrested landing aboard an aircraft carrier. A chart iden-
tifyirg some flight and mission essential functions and seme
of the iiission phases for an attack helicopter is given in
ligure 2.1.
t. System-Essential Furctions Relationships
The ability of an aircraft to fly and to conduct
its mission depends upon the continued operation of those
systems and subsystems that perform the essential functions.
If the aircraft is damaged ii combat, the operation of
certain subsystem components iray be impaired or the compo-
nent may cease to operate, and some essential functions may
be lost. The severity and rapidity with which the less of
essential functions occur is directly related to the kill
levels.
A general examinaticn of each aircraft's systems
and subsystems must be conducted to determine its specific
contribution to the essential functions identified in the
previous step. Figure 2.2 presents a sample tabulation of
those systems and subsystems that contribute to the essen-
tial functions shown in Figure 2.1. A more detailed example
of the relationship between the functions performed by one
specific subsystem and the essential functions is shown in
Figure 2.3.
c. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
The Failure Mode and Effects Analysis is a
procedure that: (1) identifies and documents all possible
failure modes of a ccmponent or subsystem, and (2) deter-
mines the effects of each failure mode upon the capability
of the system and/or subsysten to perform its essential
functions. The FMEA process and requirements are defined in
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Figure 2.3 Subsystea Functions-
Essential Functicr Relationships
The types of compccent failure modes generally
considered in the FMEfl include premature operation, failure
to operate, failure during operation, failure to cease oper-
ation, and degraded or out-cf-tolerance operation. A
U4
deter nination of the major structural or aerodynamic damage
tolerances is also performed during the FUEA. In addition,
the effects of loss cr major damage to aerodynamic surfaces
on stability and control of the aircraft are required. Data
generated should define the threshold for aerodynamic,
structural, and control limits that can be tolerated for
various flight conditions. A sample summary format for a
IMEA for two flight control roc failure modes is given in
Figure 2-U. Note in Figure 2.4 that the control rod is a
critical component for an attrition kill when it jams, tut
not when is is severed.
The FMEA is applicable to both single ccmpcnent
failures and multiple component failures. It is extremely
important to consider multiple component failures, when the
failure is due to combat damage, because of the likelihood
that lore than one ccmponent is damaged when the aircraft is
hit.
The effects of a ccmponent failure should also
include the consideration of anj transients that might occur
when the failure occurs. For example, consider a single
engine, fly-by-wire, statically unsTable aircraft with no
mechanical flight controls as tack-up. Suppose the engine-
driven generator that supplies the electrical power to the
flight control computer was to immediately cease operation
and that the computer relies on an emergency ram-air turbine
(RAT) for tack up electrical power. The RAT is designed to
he deployed into the airstrean when the electrical power
failure is sensed. However, this deployment takes time,
during which the computer could be without sufficient power.
This lack of power could cause problems with the fly-by-wire
contrcl system such as the loss of the SAS or the issuance
of hardover commands to the ccntrol surfaces which could
cause the aircraft to become u icontrollable, leading to an
aircraft loss. Thus, the assumption of redundancy in the
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d. Damage Mode and Effects Analysis (DMEA)
In the FMIA the cause of the component failure
is not stipulated. Ihe failure may or may not be related to
combat damage. TJhen specific component failures due to
combat damage, such as mechanical damage to components
caused ty projectile or fragnent penetration or damage
caused by a fire or explosion, are identified and examined,
the analysis is referred to as a DMEA. In the DMEA, the
potential component or subsystem failures identified in the
IMEA, as well as other possible damage-caused failures, are
associated with the damage mechanisms and the damage
processes. These failures are then evaluated to determine
their relationship tc the selected kill level. The quanti-
fication of the component kill criteria is also part of the
DMEA, but this procedure is described in the vulnerability
assessment presentation. The jossibility of any secondary
hazard that may be caused by the primary damage processes is
also identified in the DMEA. Examples of secondary hazards
are: ingestion of fuel by an engine, and seepage of toxic
fumes frcm a fire into the cockjit. The DMEA is referred to
as the criticality analysis of the FMECA.
The output of the E KEA can take many forms. The
DMEA matrix is similar to the IMEA summary format shown in
Figure 2.4 in which the components and their damage-caused
failure modes are related to the kill level or category.
Component redundancy relationships and the appropriate
component kill criteria should also be indicated in the
matrix. A sample EMEA matrix is given in Figure 2.5. A
disablement diagram can add to the understanding of the DMEA
matrix by graphically showing the locations of the compo-
nents and stating the effects cf component kills. A sample
disablement diagram is presented in Figure 2.6.
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There are many different kinds of damage-caused
failures or kill modes that can occur within each of the
systems cf an aircraft. Failure modes for an aircraft are
the various ways in which the aircraft can fail to te main-
tained in the required mode of flight or fail to perform its
missicD. These failure modes are constituted by the less
of, or serious degradation of, structural integrity, power,
flight control or mission required equipment, or lift.
Failure modes are established for a given aircraft and
missicn with respect to preestablished minimum requirements
for performance of the aircraft and are related to the crit-
ical components of the aircraft. Some of the most iiipcrtant
ones are listed in Table 1 and described below. The order
of the systems listed is indicative of their ccntributicn to
the total aircraft vulnerabilit 3.
(1) Zii§l System Kill Modes. The following is
a listing and brief description of the potential fuel system
kill modes.
I!li§i Supply D eplet ion . This kill mode is
caused either by danage to fuel storage components that
results in excessive leakage leading to a significant reduc-
tion in the amount of fuel available for aircraft operation,
or by damage to fuel pumping and transfer systems that
prevents fuel from reaching the engine (s).
lUzl^HK Zi£§ and Exp losion . Fire and
explosion can be caused by the ignition of the fuel-air
mixture in the ullage by incecdiary particles or by a hot
tank wall. The in-tank fire or explosion can cause substan-
tial damage to the tankage and adjacent structure and compo-
nents, and the fire may quickly spread to other parts of the
aircraft.
l9.i^ Space Fire and Expl osion . This can
te caused by fuel leakage into void spaces or dry bays
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subseguently ignited hy incendiary particles, by hot retal
surfaces, or by the hot gases from punctured bleed air lines
or engine cases. Fire or explosion in the enclosed spaces
can eventually cause significant damage to nearby subsystem
components and structure that wculd result in their failure.
The generation of smcke and tciic fumes may also occur and
migrate to crew stations, causing a possible mission abort,
forced landing, or aircraft abardonment.
Sustained Exterior Fuel Fire. This kill
mode is caused by damage to fuel tank walls resulting in
fuel spillage onto the extericr of the aircraft which is
subsequently ignited, producing a sustained fire. Sometimes
the exterior fire is snuffed cut by the airflow over the
surface; however, the conditio! of the damaged surface, the
altitude, and the flight speed may prevent this from
cccuring.
Hydraulic Ram. Damage to container walls
or components within the container caused by the intense
pressure waves generated in the contained liquid by penetra-
tors cr fragments passing through the liquid is referred to
as hydraulic ram damage. The fluid pressure can cause large
cracks and gaping holes in the container walls, leading to
excessive leakage either exterrally or internally into dry
bays, engine inlets, etc..
(2) Propulsion S;xstem Kill Modes. The
following kill modes of the propulsion system have been
observed.
Zlif2 Ingestic I. Fuel ingestion is caused
by fuel entering the engine air inlet following rupture of
walls that are common to both a fuel tank and the inlet.
Fuel ingestion effects normally include compressor surge,
severe stall, unstable burninc in the tail pipe, and/or
engine flameout.
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Foreign Object Ingestion . Foreign objects
consist cf projectiles, fragments, and pieces of damaged
aircraft components which enter the engine inlet and sutseg-
uently damage the fan and ccmjressor blades. This could
cause an engine failure or the throwing of blades through
the engine case, leading to additional component damage.
Inlet Flow Distortion. Distortion cf air
flow to the engine can be so severe as a result of combat
damage to the inlet that uncoEtrollable engine surging cr
engine failure occurs.
Lubrica tio n Starvation. Penetrator, frag-
ment, or fire damac€ to the lubrication circulation and
cooling subsystem can result in loss of lubrication and
subsequent deterioration of bearing surfaces, followed by
engine inoperabili ty . loss of lubrication failures are most
often related to the bearings, where loss of heat removal
eventually results in bearing seizure.
Compressor Case Perforation or Distqrticn.
This kill mode is caused by peretrator or fragment penetra-
tion through the case, by distortion of the case, cr by
damaged ccnipressor blades exitirg through the case.
Combustor Case Perforation. Pen et rater or
fragment penetration and holing of the combustor case, with
subsequent hot gas emission or torching through the hole,
can cause secondary damage effects, such as severe heating
of adjacent fuel tanks or contrcl rods, and can also cause a
combustion pressure drop that nay result in a significant
loss cf engine power.
Turbine Section Failure. Turbine failure
can be caused by penetrator or fragment damage to the
turbine wheels, blades, and case. This results in a loss of
engine power or secondary perforation and possible fire
damage.
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Exhaust Duct Fai lure. Penetration by
penetratcrs and fragnents into the exhaust duct may result
in damage to nozzle control lines and actuator mechanisms
and possible fuel spillage and secondary fire if an
augmentor is operating at the time of the hit.
Infills Con trols and Accessories failure.
A kill of the controls and accessories can be caused by
penetratcr, fragment, or fire damage. The result can be
loss of control of the engine cr loss of one of the impor-
tant accessories.
(3) Flisii Contr ol System Kill Modes. Some
possible flight control kill modes are listed below.
Disruption cf Control Signal Path.
Severence or jamming of the mechanical or electrical path
that trarsmits the control signals from the pilot to the
control surfaces or the actuators can partially cr totally
incapacitate the control system.
Los^ of Cont r cl Power. Control power can
be lest as a result of damage to hydraulic power components
which causes a loss cf hydraulic pressure. Types of power
system damage are thermal degradation due to fire, perfora-
tion of hydraulic reservoirs, cylinders, or lines leading to
a loss cf hydraulic fluid, ard deformation of hydraulic
components, actuators, or lines that cause a hydraulic lock
or jammed condition.
Loss of Aircraft Motion Data. Damage to
the aircraft motion sensors or to the sensor data signal
paths to the flight control ccnputer can prevent the auto-
pilot and the stability augraertation system from properly
controlling the motion of the aircraft. The results can
vary from a partial loss of control, leading to a mission
abort, to the loss of an out-cf-control aircraft. These
components are relatively soft and are easily damaged or
severed ty penetrators, fragments, and fire.
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Damage to Ccntrol Surfaces and Hinges.
Penetrators, fragments, blast, and fire damage can result in
the physical removal of a porticn or all of a flight ccntrol
surface cr in the jacming of the hinges, rods, and ether
linkages tetween the servcactuators and the ccntrol
surfaces.
Hydraulic FluM Fire. Fires can result
from the ignition of pressurized or gravity-leaked hydraulic
fluid, and smoke or tcxic fumes from the fire can affect the
crew.
(4) Power Train and Rotor Blade/Prop elle r
Sy stem Kill Modes. Some of the possitle kill
modes within the power train and rotor blade system of heli-
copters and propeller driver, fixed-wing aircraft are
descrited below.
Loss of Lubrication. This kill mode can
occur due to projectile or fragment perforation of oil or
grease containing components, with subsequent loss of lubri-
cation oil or grease. Lubrication starvation is especially
critical in oil-cooled helicopter transmissions, where the
oil systems are not self-contained and usually consist of
externally mounted components, such as sumps, filters,
coolers, and interconnecting lines and hoses. Loss of
lubrication prevents the removal of heat and lubrication of
rubbing surfaces, which eventually results in ccmpcnent
seizure. In helicopter transmissions and gear boxes, fail-
ures are often catastrophic, causing case rupture and fire
after input pinion failures and rotor blade seizure after
planetary assembly failures.
Mechanical/St luctural Damage. Mechanical
or structural failure of power train components can be
caused by fragment and penetratcr inpact or penetration, or
by fire. Bearings, gears, ard shafts are prone to damage
and failure when hit, shafts can be severed, and hearings
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and gears can jam. Chips and debris from damaged compcnents
or structure can jam the oil punp, causing loss of lubrica-
tion, Eotor blades and propellers when hit can result in
rotor untalance, blade instability, blade out-of -track, and
loss of lift. Eotor unbalance is perhaps the most critical
consequence of ballistic damage and occurs when a portion of
the blade is removed. This less of mass in one blade can
cause large, alternating hub forces and intense cockpit and
control vibrations, leading to structural failure or loss of
control. Blade instability is caused by a reduction of
blade stiffness due to damage and can result in severe
flutter cr divergent pitch oscillation that can be cata-
strophic. Blade out-of-track is usually a less severe
result cf the reduction of blade stiffness, but it could
result in blade contact with the fuselage. Although scire
loss of lift normally accompanies any ballistic damage, the
consequences are usually not as catastrophic as those asso-
ciated with the other types of tlade reactions.
(5) Crew System Kill Modes. The inability of
the pilot and his or her replacement to operate the aircraft
because cf injury, incapacitation, or death will usually
lead to an aircraft kill in a very short period of time.
(6) Structural System Kill M odes . The struc-
tural system is usually the toughest system on the aircraft.
However, structural damage car be sufficient to cause an
aircraft kill. Some possible structural kill modes are
listed below.
Structure Removal. Physical severence or
complete loss of large portions of the load-carrying
aircraft structure caused by multiple penetrators and frag-
ments, blast, fire, or radiation effects can result in
either an immediate cr a delayec aircraft loss.
Pressure Overload. Immediate failure or
subsequent failure urder maneuver loads can be caused by
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external tlast effects which result in over-stressing the
load carrying structure.
Thermal Weakening. Structural failure can
occur to portions of the load-carrying structure as a result
of internal void space fires, externally sustained fires, or
radiation over a portion of the aircraft surface.
Peretration. A single penetration of one
load-carrying member will usually not cause structural
failure; several memters must be penetrated or cut befcre
failure can occur. Since the likelihood of structural
failure from penetration by a few fragments cr armcr-
piercing projectiles is extremely small, this type of
failure would most likely result from continuous rod warhead
effects.
(7) Electrical Power System Kill Modes. The
failure of electrical system components is due to the
severing or grounding of electrical circuits, the destruc-
tion or unbalancing of rotating components, such as genera-
tors and alternators, and the penetration or overheating of
batteries.
(8) Armament System Kill Modes. Two major
reactions can occur when gun amnunition, bombs, rockets, and
missiles are hit by a damage mechanism. One is a sustained
fire in the magazine that could cause cook-off or detonation
of the stored ammunition, and the other is a severe explo-
sion of either the arnament or the propellant.
(^) Avicnics System jSill Modes. Avionics
components are usually very soft and are easily damaged by
penetrators and fragments, blast, radiation, and thermal
hazards, such as fire or hot gas torching. Their kill mode
is usually failure to operate, although a degraded operation
is possible.
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e. Fault Tre€ Analysis (FTA)
As descrited in the preceding section, the FMEA
is a tottoffl-up approach to determine an aircraft's critical
components. In the FMEA, the failure of a component is
assumed and the consequences of that failure are identified.
Another procedure for identifyirg critical components is the
Fault Tree Analysis. The FTA is a top-down approach which
starts with an undesired event and then determines what
event or combinaticn of events can cause the undesired
event. The Fault Tree Analysis is one of the principal
methods of system safety analysis, and can include both
hardware failures and human effects. The generic fault tree
diagram shewn in Figure 2.7 demcnstrates the logic symbclogy
used in the Fault Tree Analysis.
The undesired event D can only occur when event
A and event B occurs. (This is the logical AND gate). Event
A can occur when event C or evert D occurs, or if both event
C and event D occurs. (This is the inclusive OE gate)
.
Event B can occur when event E or event F occurs, but not
when both event E and event F occurs. (This is the exclusive
CR gate) . Because tie undesired events of interest here are
failures caused by (damage, the FTA will be referred to as
the Damage Tree Analysis.
A portion of a damage tree diagram for a twin-
engine aircraft with a single fuel supply source to both
engines is illustrated in Figure 2.8c. The undesired event
is an aircraft attrition kill. An attrition kill occurs if
the aircraft can neither fly nor land. The aircraft cannot
fly if it loses lift, or thrust, or control. Loss of thrust
will cccur when both engines fail or when the common fuel
supply tc both engines fails. leakage from damage caused by
penetration or hydraulic ram from the feed tank that
supplies fuel to both engines will cause the fuel system to
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EVENTC EVENTD EVENT E EVENT
F
Figure 2.7 A Generic Fault Tree Diagram
fail. The left ergine can fail due to engine damage or the
loss cf the left engine fuel supply. The left engine fuel
supply system can fail due to penetration of many cf the
fuel transfer componeLts from the feed tanks to the engine
combustor, or these components can fail due to fire caused
hy leaking fuel, leaking hydraulic fluid, or a holed ccmtu-
stor. Ihe left engine can fail due to damage caused by fuel
ingestion, penetraticn of the engine compressor, combustor.
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or turbine, loss of lubricdticn, fire caused by leaking
fuel, or damage to the engine ccntrols or accessories.
f. Kill Trees and Kill Expressions
Results cf the stefs described above leads to
the identification of a set cf critical components in a













Figure 2.8a Portion of a Damage Tree Diagram

































































Figure 2.8c Portion of a Eamage Tree Diagram Cont'd
and selected kill level. Each critical component either
makes a singular contribution to an essential function or
each ccmjonent is one of two or more redundant ccmpcnents,
each of which can lake the necessary contribution. The
distinction between nonredundant critical components and
redundant critical components is extremely important and
will te demonstrated in the following sections.
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(1) TY^ical Critical Components. For a two
engine, single pilot helicopter, the following nonredundant
compcnents are potential critical components for an attri-
tion kill: (1) Flight control system components (reds, rod
ends, bellcranks, pitch links, swashplate, hydraulic actua-
tors, collective lever, and control pedals), (2) Rotor
Hade and power train componerts (blades, drive shafts,
rotor heads, main transmission, and gear boxes)
, (3) Fuel
system ccmponents (fuel cells, the sump, lines, and valves)
,
(U) Pilot, and (5) Tail boom.
The followinc redundant components are
potential critical components for an attrition kill: (1)
Propulsion system ccnnponents (engine and engine mounts),
(2) Hydraulic subsystem compcrents, and (3) Structural
elements.
For a single engine, single pilot, fixed-
wing aircraft, some potential redundant and nonredundant
critical components are: (1) Pilot, (2) Flight controls in
the ccckpit and the pitch axis flight control components,
(3) Hydraulic reservoirs, high-pressure lines, components
and actuators, (4) All fuel tarks, components, lines, and
shut-off valves, (5) Engine far, compressor, turbine, and
combustor sections, drive shaft and bearings, engine mounts,
and the lubrication and fuel supply components, (6) Major
structure, such as wing box spars, fuselage longerons, and
the horizontal and vertical stabilizer spars and attach-
ments, (7) External ordnance and the ammunition storage
drum, (8) Liquid oxygen (lOX) bottle and components, and
(9) Liguid-cooled avicnics with a flammable coolant.
(2) The Kill Tree. A visual illustration of
the critical components and of the contribution of component
redundancy is provided by the kill tree. In order to kill
the aircraft a complete cut through the tree trunk is
required. A sample kill tree for a two engine, two pilot
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heliccfter is shown iv. Figure 2.9. For example, according
to the kill tree in Figure 2.S, a loss of the pilct and
either the co-pilot or the co-pilot*s controls will lead to
an aircraft kill, as will a less of the drive train or loss
cf fuel feed.
(3) The Kill Expression. The relationship
tetween component loss and an aircraft kill can be expressed
using the logical AND and OB statements. This logical
expression is called the kill eipression. As an example, a
portion of the kill expression for the kill tree depicted in
Figure 2.9 is given ty:
[ (Pilot .OR. Pilot Contrcls) .AND. (Copilot
.OE. Copilot Controls) ] .OR. (Engine 1 .AND.
.OR. (Drive Train) .CB. etc.
C. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT
^ • Defining a Vulne rabili t 7 Assessment
A vulnerability assessirent is the process of deter-
mining numerical values for the measures of vulnerability.
Target vulnerability analysis is a scientific discipline
involving both experimental and analytical processes.
Preliminary theories which attenpt to describe the response
of a target to a particular threat is accomplished during
the analysis. Experimentaticr provides the data used to
corroborate or repudiate the theories developed during anal-
ysis. Target vulnerability concepts are based or funda-
mental physical principles. These principles include the
theory of: hydraulic ram, icnition, crack propagation,
engine response to fuel ingestion, and structural response
to blast and penetration. Vulnerability assessments may be
carried out entirely "by hand", or one or more computer
programs may be used. Assessments are usually conducted to































more impcrtantly , by the militaiy to predict the response of
targets to a particular threat before threat and target
engagenieDt
.
A vulnerability assessment is carried out at one of
three general levels cf detail. These levels are estimates,
evaluations, and analyses. Mcst assessments consider five
fragment impact velocities frcn 1000 to 10,000 ft/sec and
use as a minimum, the six cardinal aspects- For a minimum
level assessment, the six major aspects shown in Figure 2.10
are usually considered for each kill level. The 26 aspects
depicted in Figure 2.11 are usually considered when a mere
detailed analysis cr a computer analysis is performed.
Estimates typically use simple equations for the aircraft
vulnerahility measures that are functions of a few major
parameters. These equations are referred to as regression
equations if they are fitted tc historical data on several
aircraft or to the results from engineering studies.
Evaluations are more detailed than estimates and may include
such items as the individual coirponent locations, sizes, and
vulnerability measures. Analyses are very detailed assess-
ment studies that use specific technical and functional
information about the componerts and their vulnerability.
Analyses are usually conducted on a digital computer using
complex geometric target models.
2 • lJ3iil££§.^ili:i:J Measures
Because of the diverse nature of the hostile envi-
ronment in which aircraft operate, the measures of the
vulnerability of an aircraft vary with the type of threat
encountered. For example, if a hit on the aircraft must
occur in order for a threat to be effective, such as a small
arms projectile and a contact- fuzed high explosive warhead,
one measure of vulnerability is the conditional probability







































































P . Another measure of vulnerability to impacting damage
K/
H
mechanisms is the aircraft's vulnerable area, A^
.
Vulnerable area is a theoretical, non-unique area presented
to the threat which, if hit tj a damage mechanism, would
result ir an aircraft kill. Cr the other hand, when damage
is caused by the effects of a rearby high explosive detona-
tion, the vulnerability may be expressed in the form of a
P (probability of kill given a detonation) envelope.
This envelope represents a kill probability contour about
the aircraft on which a specified detonation will result in
a certain probability of aircraft kill. If only the blast
from the exploding warhead is considered, the envelope
represents the aircraft's vulnerability to external blast.
A measurement which is becoming more important relates to
aircraft vulnerability to a laser threat. Laser vulner-
ability can be measured by the probability of kill, given a
specific power laser lock-on for a specified period of tine,
F
K/Lo
3 . General Requirements
Certain required elements of a vulnerability assess-
ment are common to all studies, regardless of the type of
threat considered. These elements are: (1) a selection of
the aircraft kill levels or categories to be assessed, (2)
an assembly of the technical a rd functional descriptions of
the aircraft, (3) a determination of the critical components
of the aircraft, (U) a selecticr of the specific threats the
system will encounter, (5) an analysis to identify the type
and amount of damage required to kill each critical compo-
nent, and (6) the computatior of the appropriate vulner-
ability measures for the components and the aircraft based
upon the threat selected. The first three steps of the
assessment have been described in the preceding section. A
presentation of the last three steps follows.
a. Threat Selection
Because of the many diverse and terminal effects
of the various damage mechanisis, each vulnerability assess-
ment is usually made considerinc either a specific threat or
a specific damage mechanism. Mechanisms which may cause
damage to an aircraft may be classified as: kinetic energy
penetratcrs such as projectiles and fragments, internal and
external blast, pyrcphorics, shaped charged jets, focused
blast fragments and lasers.
Kinetic energy penetrators include, but are not
limited to, ball projectiles, armor piercing projectiles,
and fragments. These penetratcrs cause damage to aircraft
components during penetration and perforation. Armor
piercing projectiles are constructed with a hardened core
which enhances the penetratioE characteristics of these
projectiles over those of the lall type. Most small armor
piercing projectiles are prone to tumbling after impact
thereby increasing the size of the hole that they tear in
the internal components.
Armor piercing incerdiary projectiles contain an
incendiary nix encased within the nose of the projectile
ahead of a hardened case. Upon impact the jacket peels off,
and the incendiary material flashes as the projectile core
penetrates the target.
Large high explosi^ie projectiles and missiles
can be equipped with influence cr command fuzes causing them
to detonate nearby an aircraft. These projectiles or
missiles have the capability of inflicting damage from
external blast effects, fragment impact effects, or a combi-
nation of both.
Many smaller high explosive projectiles are
equipped with delay fuzes. These fuzes initiate upon
contact with the aircraft skin and detonate the projectile
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liithiE the aircraft. This high explosive detonation
produces internal blast and fragmentation effects. These
fragments usually are smaller and slower than the larger
high explosive projectiles but the proximity of the detona-
tion to the critical components results in a spray of many
fragments impacting the components. This combination of
internal blast and fragmentation effects is especially
lethal to lightly ccEstructed components such as oil and
fuel lines, oil and fuel tanks, hydraulic tanks, and the
aircre*.
b. Critical Component Fill Criteria
Once the set of critical components for a given
aircraft has been identified, the damage or kill criteria
for each of the failure modes of these components must be
determined for the selected threats. Damage criteria for a
critical component is the level of damage required for a
preestablished degradation of the performance of the compo-
nent. Thus, a kill criterion is the specific descriptive
characteristics or quantification of a component failure.
Some examples of critical compcrent kill criteria are: the
amount of material that must b€ removed from a drive shaft
for failure, requirements fcr failure of a structural
member/ the amount cf damage required to incapacitate a
system of gears, the minimum diameter of hole in a fuel tank
or line for engine starvaticr within a specified time
period, etc. Very few kill criteria are precisely known,
nor can they easily be determired. Battle damage reports
are an important source of component damage effects infcrma-
tion. The results of tests conducted on all types of
aircraft components and subsystems provide another increas-
ingly important and expanding source of data. Data is
required for each critical conponent that allows for the
effects cf encounter parameter -sariations, such as fragment
71
or penetrator striking velocity, obliquity angle, shape and
mass cf the fragment cr penetrator, to be estimated for each
kill category and level being assessed. In the case of
externally detonating warheads, high explosive projectiles,
and contact-fuzed lissiles, miss distance boundaries
relating P to burst points are established to assess
K/H
blast effects of these threats.
The major result of this task is the specifica-
tion of numerical values for the kill criteria for each
failure node for each critical component for each threat to
be considered. Three specific kill criteria are currently
in use fcr the impacting damage mechanisms. They are the
probability of component kill given a hit, the area removal
criterion, and the energy density criterion. There is a
fourth criterion which applies to the blast damage
mecharisirs.
C) The Probability of Kill Given a Hit
Function. The P^/h function defines the
probability of a component kill when impacted by a fragment
cr penetrator. This criterion can be presented graphically
as a function of the irass and velocity of the damage mecha-
nism, or it can be expressed in an analytical form. Figure
2.12 is a sample of P]^/^ data fcr a flight control red.
The \/-^ criterion is normally used for
components that can be killed bj a single hit, such as crew
members, control rods, electronic equipment, and servoactua-
tors. These components are sc netimes referred to as single
fragment vulnerable components. It can also be used for
some cf the larger components, such as engines and fuel
tanks. In this case, the volume of the large component is
usually divided intc several smaller volumes, and a
different numerical value of P, ,, is assigned to each
volume. For example, a fuel tank could be divided into the
ullage, fuel, and external vcid spaces, and a turbojet
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engine cculJ be sul-divideJ ii. t c the oajor sections illus-
trated in Figure 2.13.
The determination of the P
"k/h
fcr each
component or part cf a component is a very difficult under-
taking. It requires a combination of critical ccmpcnent



























Figure 2.12 Typical P)<;/h Data for a Flight Contrcl Bod
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limited gunfire testing provides some insight into the
effects cf projectile and fragment damage potential, there
is no universal methodology f cr arriving at a numerical
value for Pw^ • The larger components, such as the fuel
tanks and engines, are especially difficult to evaluate due
to the iiultitude of local ervironments, the constantly
changing operation conditions, and the many different
failure nodes, Numhers for
'^i^/h ^^^ eventually assigned
based upon a combination of enpirical information, engi-
neering judgment, and experience.
The location of the component inside the
aircraft will have ar influence on its ultimate numerical
probability of kill given a hit, but not on its P^/^ func-
tion. Components located behind thick structures cr dense
equipment packs will receive a level of protection due to
the slowdown of the damage mechanism as it attempts to pene-
trate the shielding ccmponents. The numerical value of the
^k/h ^^^ ^^^ lowered velocity of impact will generally be
less than the P^/h ^^r the impact of a penetrator cr frag-
nent that was not slewed down. Other considerations, such
as spall and fragment breakup caused by the intervening
components also becomes important.
The area renoval criterion defines a
specific amount of area that must be removed from a compo-
nent in order to kill that ccnponent. This criterion is
applicable to large penetrators, such as rods, and to the
closely spaced hits from many fragments. The total compo-
nent damage from a collection of closely spaced hits can be
greater than the sum of the individual damages from the same
number of widely spaced hits. Cften there is a synergism of
damage due to cracking and petalling between the individual
holes, and large areas of component structure can he removed
or destroyed. This criterion is used mainly for structural
components.
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(2) Energy Densit 7. In this criterion, a
component kill is expressed in terms of a required miDimum
component surface area that must be exposed to a minimum
threshold level of the kinetic energy density of the
impacting damage mechanisms. Ihis criterion is applicable
to closely spaced multiple fragnent hits and is used for the
structural components, as well as other large components,
such as the fuel tarks and engines. For some components,
there may be a mininum mass of the damage mechanism telow
which the criterion is not applied.
(3) Blast. The damage criterion for hlast is
generally the critical values of pressure and impulse en an
aircraft surface necessary to cause the specific component
damage level associated with the assumed kill level. For
example, a dynamic overpressure of two pounds per square
inch ever the upper surface ci a horizontal tail for one
milliseccnd may be sufficient te cause crushing of the skin,
leading to a loss of stiffness and the inability to support
the flight loads. Although this criterion is usually
applied to the structural components and control surfaces,
the effects of the blast can extend into the interior of the
aircraft and can damage electrical wiring, hydraulic lines,
fuel tank walls, and ether internal components located close
to the aircraft skin.
c. Computaticn of the "Vulnerability Measures
The procedures used to compute the vulnerability
of an aircraft and its components to an externally deto-
nating high explosive warhead and non-explosive penetrators
or fragments, to an internally detonating high explosive
warhead, and to lasers are described in the following three
sections.
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D. VDLNEEABILITY TO EXTERNALII DETONATING WARHEADS
Vulnerability of an aircraft to an externally detonating
high explosive warhead is usually analyzed in two steps.
The first step is a determination of the aircraft's vulner-
ability to the blast, and the second step analyzes the
aircraft's vulnerability to the fragments and penetrators.
In addition, both analyses must consider the encounter scen-
ario between the aircraft and the missile at the time of
warhead detonation. For this reason, this section has been
divided into the following two subsections: the effect of
fragments and penetrators striking an aircraft, and blast.
Shortly after detonation, the blast front precedes the frag-
ments. Eventually, the fragnents pass through the blast
front because the fragment velocity decay is less than the
blast front velocity decay. The overpressure caused by the
warhead detonation can cause serious damage to aircraft
structure and components. Using the conditions of the
encounter scenario, the blast is analyzed for impulse and
overpressure to determine iso-damage contours for an
aircraft kill. If a detonation occurs close enough to
inflict serious blast damage, the fragments most likely will
cause much more damage than that caused by the blast. In
the fragments and penetrators subsection, the vulnerability
to fragicents and penetrators is computed for both the single
hit case and the multiple hit case. A typical encounter is
shown in Figure 2.14.
1* Effect of Fragments/ Penetrators Striking an Aircraft
The vulnerability of an aircraft to a single
impacting penetrator or fragmert is usually expressed as a
total vulnerable area. Ay/ or as a probability of aircraft
kill given a random hit on the aircraft, P k/h • The vulner-
able area concept is applicable to both the aircraft and to
77
Figure 2. 14 Typical Aircraft Encoanter With
An, Externally Detonating HE Warhead
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its critical components. The vulnerable area of the typical
ith ccicpcnent is denoted by A , and the component kill
criterion used is the probability of kill given a hit,
P, ,, , To assist the reader in keeping track of the nota-
tion used in this presentation, the variable and subscript
definitions are summarized in Table 2.
TABLE 2
VDlnerability Assessment Variable Definitions
Definition
Probability of killing the ith component
given a hit on the ith compcnent
Probability of killing the ith component
given a hit on the aircraft
Probability of killing the aircraft
given a hit on tie aircraft
Vulnerable area of the ith component
Vulnerable area cf the aircraft
Presented area of the ith ccmponent
Presented area of the aircraft
Note that a distinction is made between component
and aircraft designated variables by using lower








The vulnerable area of the ith component is defined
as the product of the presented area of the compcneit in the
plane normal to the approach direction of the damage mecha-
nism (the shotline) , A , and the probability of kill cf the
Pi
component given a hit on the ccnponent, P]^/^. . Thus,
A^. = A^ X P^,^ (2.1)
X Pi k/h^
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since both A and F]^/^. are generally functions of the
threat direction or aspect, the vulnerable area will also
vary with aspect. In the discussion that follows, it is
important to recall that:
where P is the probability the aircraft or ccmpcnent
S/H
survives the hit, and P is the probability of killing
K/
H
that aircraft or compcnent.
The kill probability of the ith component given a
random hit on the aircraft, Pj^/h. / is:
\/E^ ^ •^h/H^ ^ \/h^ (2.3)
where Ph/n- ^^ ^^^ prcbability the component is hit given a
hit on the aircraft, and P]^/^. is defined as the probability
the component is killed given a hit on the component. From
Iguaticn 2.2, it follows that:
Ps/H. = 1 - Pk/H. (2.4)
Using Equations 2,1 and 2.3, arc solving for P^/h. gives:
Vh. = ^p. / h <2.5)
where Ap is the presented area of the total aircraft in the
plane normal to the threat direction. Substituting
Equations 2.5 and 2.1 into Equation 2.3 determines, for any
randoff hit on the aircraft, tie probability the ith compo-
nent is killed, and is given by:
I^/H. = K. / Ap (2.6)
1 1
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The numerical value for P, ,„ depends upcr the
presented area of the critical component, Ap. , and of the
aircraft, Ap , and upon the component kill criterion, Pk/h' •
The presented area of the critical components and of the
aircraft can be obtained frcm the available techrical
description of the aircraft. The procedure for determining
the numerical value for P^/h. is described in the presenta-
tion on the critical component kill criteria given atove.
In this assessment, a component is assumed to be
either operating and performicg all of its functions or
Tcilled. No degradation of component capabilities is consid-
ered due to a hit, and no compounding of component damage is
recognized. Although these assumptions are usually made in
a vulnerability assessment, they are not necessary.
Theoretically, only the component hit can be killed.
Although the kill of adjacent components, perhaps by fire or
explosion, is not directly considered here, a procedure for
indirectly accounting for kills of adjacent components will
te described later.
Now that the concepts of vulnerable area and the
probability of kill given a hit have been explained, the
scenario must be considered. In any given combat engage-
ment, the aircraft will either not be hit, it will be hit
only cnce, or the aircraft will be hit more than once. The
Eo hit situation is not of interest here. The location on
the presented area of the aircraft of the single hit ard of
multiple hits is assumed in the vulnerability assessment to
te a random distribution, with each damage mechanism having
the same approach or attack direction. In other words, the
assumption is usually made that the enemy has no capability
to direct hits to any one particular component, subsystem,
or part of the aircraft, and that the damage mechanisms
travel along parallel shotlines. The single hit case lays
the ground work for the multiple hit case. In both cases.
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the influence of nonredundancy and redundancy of ccniponerts
on th€ vulnerable area must be examined. Overlap of crit-
ical components is also an important consideration.
a. Single Hit Vulnerability
Both the nonredundant aircraft model and the
redundant aircraft model considered in this section are
assumed to receive orly one hit. The nonredundant aircraft
model is composed of only one of each of the critical compo-
nents. Thus, the less of anj one critical component will
cause the loss of the aircraft. In the redundant aircraft
model, seme of the critical ccmponent functions are dupli-
cated by the same or different components. The effects of
overlapping of both nonredundant and redundant critical
components are examined. For example, the fact that an
engine overlaps (shields) a hydraulic pump will probably
decrease the probability of kill of that pump. It is neces-
sary to specify how this overlap effect is quantified for
both the nonredundant and redundant aircraft models.
C) Aircraft Model Composed of Nonredundant
Components with No Overlap. This aircraft
consists of N critical components whose functions are not
duplicated by any other component. The components are
arranged in such a way that nc components overlap when
viewed from a given aspect. Any hit on the aircraft takes
place along a shotlire that passes completely through the
aircraft. Thus, no more than one component can be hit en
any one shotline. As an exanple. Figure 2.15 shows an
aircraft consisting of three critical components; a pilot,
one fuel tank, and one engine. None of the critical compo-
nents overlap in the aspect presented in Figure 2.15.
The probability of killing this aircraft,
given a random hit oe the preserted area in Figure 2.15, can






























2.6. Fcr an aircraft composeo of N nonredundant critical
components, the kill Gxpressioc is:
Kill = (Nrcl) .OR. (Nrc2) .OR. (NrcN) (2.7)
vhere Nici refers to a kill of the ith nonredundant ccmpo-
nent. In other words the aircraft kill is defined by the
kill of nonredundant component number 1, or nonredundant
component number 2, or -.., or nonredundant component number
N. Because a kill of any one of the critical components
will kill the aircraft, the aircraft will survive only if
all of the nonredundant critical components survive. Thus,
P =P xP X xE (2.8)
S/H s/H^ s/H^ S/H^
Using Equation 2.4, Equation 2-£ may be written as:
... X (1 - P^/hJ
Eor our model aircraft N=3, and Equation 2.9 becomes:
(Pu/u X P, ,„ ) + (J, .„ X P, ,„ ) + (P, ,u x
Pk/H3 ) - (Pk/Hi X E,,/H2 X Pk/H3 )
Because of the assumption that cnly the component hit can be
killed, and because none of the critical components overlap,
the kills of the components are mutually exclusive. This
means only one component can be killed by one hit, and the
products of the Pj^/h. given in Equation 2.10 are not appli-
cable. Therefore, Equation 2.1C simplifies to:
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and the probability cf killing the aircraft given a hit on
the aircraft is just the sum of the individual probabilities
of killing each of the critical components given a random
hit or the aircraft. This may he written as:
Pk/H = Vhi * Pk/H2 + ... + 5k/H^ (2.12)
Substituting Equation 2.6 into Equation 2.8, and applying
the ccncept of Pj^/j^ expressed ir Equation 2.1, leads to:
Pk/h = *v / *p '2-")
where A is the summation of vulnerable area of all of the
V
critical components.
For our example aircraft, the kill expres-
sion is given by:
Kill = (Pilot) .OR. (Fuel TaE]<) .OR. (Engine) (2.14)
From Equation 2. 12:
P = P + P + P (2. 15)K/H k/H k/H ^k/H ^^' -^'
and
A^ = A^ + A^ + A (2.16)
P f "^e
where the subscripts p, f, and € denote the pilot, the fuel
tank, and the engine. From Equation 2.1, the individual
compccent areas are given by:




A = A X P (2. 18)
f f
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A = A X P , ,,V p k/n
e ^e ' e
(2.19)
For illustration, a numerical example is
presented in Table 3.
TABLE 3
Nonredundant Model Without Overlap
































The kill of ere critical component due to
damage caused by a hit on another critical component and the
consideration of multiple kill nodes of a critical component
can be indirectly accounted for, in this model, by
increasing the numerical value cf the kill criterion for the
component hit. Consider two failure modes that are not
mutually exclusive, that is, hoth can occur with a single
hit. For example, suppose the probability the fuel tank of
an aircraft is destroyed by a fire when the fuel tar.k is
hit, is taken as 0.3. Suppose further that the probability
that the fuel tank is penetrated and that hydraulic ram
damage causes fuel to be dumped into the air inlet and
ingested by the engine, leadirg to an aircraft loss, is
taken as 0.1. The aircraft will survive a hit ir the fuel
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tank cnly if there is neither a fire nor any fuel ingestion.
The prohability that neither of these failure modes occur
when the fuel tank is hit is given by the product of the
probatility that there is no fire (1 - 0.3)/ and the prob-
ability that there is no fuel ingestion kill of the engine
(1 - 0.1), which is 0.63. Therefore, the probability that
there will be a fire kill anc/or a fuel ingestion kill,
given a hit on the fuel tank, is given by (1 - 0.63) , or
C.37. A numerical example is presented in Table 4.
TABLI 4
Nonredundant Model Without Overlap









Pilot a ft2 1.0 H.O ft2 .0133
Fuel 60 ft2 0.3-; 22.2 ft2 .0740
Engine 50 ft2 0.6 30.0 ft2 .1000
Ap = 300 ft2 s = 56.2 ft^ ^K/H = .1873




the sum of the two individual kill probabilities because
there can be both a fire kill and a fuel ingestion kill on
the one hit. Comparing Table 3 with Table 4 shows that by
accounting for the additional failure mode of fuel irgestion
by the engine increases the fuel tank \/y^ with the acccmpa-
nying change in component and aircraft vulnerable area, and
the component and aircraft probability of kill. This same
procedure can be used to compute the ? j^/^ . due to multiple
failure modes of one critical component.
(2) Aircraft Model Composed of Nop redundant
Com t: Clients with Overlap. The aircraft
model will now be expanded by allowing two or more critical
components to overlap in an arbitrary manner. An example
aircraft is presented in Figure 2. 16. There can be any
number of critical ccmponents along a shotline within the
overlap area. For the aircraft to survive a hit alcng a
shotline within a region of N overlapping critical compo-
nents, each critical component along that shotline must
survive. The probability the aircraft survives a hit on the
overlap region, ^ /u * ^^ given by:
s/h^ s/h-j^ s/n2
^/"n
Because two or more critical components in the overlap
region can be killed by one hit, the kills of more than one
compcnent are not lutually exclusive. In this case.
Equation 2.11 is not valid, and Equation 2.20 must be used
for hits in the overlap region. For the aircraft illus-
trated in Figure 2.16, the probability the aircraft survives
a hit on the overlap region is given by Equation 2.21, where






X P ., (2.21)
s/h^ s/h^ s/hg '
If the overlaj area, A , is new consid-
Po
ered as a separate ccaponent, the probability of kill given
a hit on the component may be written as:


































and the vulnerable area of the overlap area^ A^ , is given
ty:
A = A X P (2.23)
Vq Po ^/^o
Substituting Eguation 2.21 intc Eguation 2.23, and using
Equation 2.4, gives:
o f ' e
It is assumed for this example that the
overlap area in Figure 2.16 is 10 ft^, the fuel tank F
,^/y^
is
0.3/ the engine P, „ is 0.6, and all other areas arc the
^ k/h
same as used in the nonoverla jping example. The fuel is
assumed tc slow the damage mechanism down, but not enough to
change the engine P]^/}^ . Because the P^/h values are the
same as in the nonoverlapping example, any reduction ir the
vulnerable area of tie aircraft is due only to the component
overlap. Thus, in the overlap region:
^k/h = '' " [(1-0-3) X (1-0.6)] = 0.72 (2.25)
and
A = 10 X 0.72 = 1.2 ft2 (2.26)
according to Equations 2.23 and 2. 24.
The vulnerable area of the overlap area
contributes to the aircraft vulrerable area. However, over-
lapping also requires that the overlap area be subtracted
from the total presented area cf each overlapping component
contributing to the overlap. The component area outside of
the overlap is treated in the usual way. Table 5 illus-
trates computing the vulnerable area of an aircraft with
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overlappicg components. Note that locating two of the crit-
ical conijonents such that one overlaps the other reduces the
aircraft vulnerable area form 52 ft^ to 50.2 ft^. This is
an example of how location of the critical components can
reduce tie aircraft's vulnerable area.
TABLE 5
"Vulnerable Area Computati<













Pilot 4 ft2 4.0 ft2
Fuel 60-10=50 ft2 0.3 15.0 ft2
Engine 50-10=40 ft2 0.6 24.0 ft2
Overlap
Area 10 ft2 0.72 7.2 ft2
\ = 50.2 ft2
The net effect of component overlap can be
a desirable reducticc in aircraft vulnerable area provided
the damage inflicted by the hit in the overlap area does not
cause ether problems. For example, consider a shctline
through the fuel tank that overlaps the engine. Fuel could
leak from the punctured tank onto hot engine parts, causing
a fire. In this irstance, the probability the engine is
killed by the hit wculd probatly be higher than 0.6. An
example of the computation of aircraft vulnerable area,
assuming the possibility of ar engine fire, is given in




is assumed to be 0.3, and the P, ,, for thek/h ' k/h
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engine is taken as O.S because an engine fire is assumed to
occur nearly always due to a hit on the overlapping fuel
tank. Then,
P = 1 - [ (1 - 0.3) X (1 - 0.9) ] (2.27)k/h
' o
and the aircraft's vulnerable area increases to 52,3 ft^.
TABLE 6
Valnerable Area Computation for Nonredundant
Model With Overlap aid an Engine Fire
Critical A i P, ,, = A
Ccmpcnent Pi
'^/'^i ^i
Pilot 4 ft2 1.0 4.0 ft2
Fuel 60-10=50 ft2 0.3 15.0 ft2
Engine 50-10=40 ft2 0.6 24.0 ft 2
Cverlap
Area 10 ft2 0.93 9.3 ft2
A = 52.3 ft2
V
Comparing the aircraft's vulnerable areas
given in Tables Z, 5, and 6 reveals that overlapping the
engine with the fuel tank reduces the vulnerable area from
52 ft2 to 50.2 ft2, provided no fire can occur. If a fire
is likely to occur, the vulnerable area increases form 52
ft2 to 52.3 ft2. Thus, overlapping nonredundant critical
components can reduce vulnerability provided that no undesi-
rable secondary kill nodes occur.
Another facet of the overlap situation is
the change in the vulnerable area of the overlap area that
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occurs when one of the componerts along a shotline has its
vulneratility reduced by use cf a vulnerability reduction
technique. For example suppose the Pj^/^ of the overlapping
fuel tanl^ is reduced from 0.3 to 0.0. The vulnerable area
cf the overlap section, with the possibility of a fire, is
reduced from 7.2 ft2 to 6.0 f t^ . This reduction appears to
conflict with the fact that 10 ft^ with a Pk/h of 0.3, and a
vulnerable area of 3.0 ft^, has been made invulnerable. The
reason for this apparent contradiction is the fact that the
fuel tank is only one of two overlapping components.
Generally, when the vulneratility of one component is
reduced, the vulnerability of another component along the
shotline will become nore important. The vulnerable area of
each ccmponent along the shotlice is referred to as the true
vulnerable area, and the conponents contribution to the
overlap ^julnerable area is referred to as the incremental
vulnerable area. Using the data of Table 5, the true vuln-
erable areas are 3 ft^ and 6 tt^ for the overlapping fuel
tank ard engine areas, and the incremental vulnerable areas
of the two overlapping componeits are 1.2 ft^ and 4.2 ft^
respectively.
(3) Aircraft Mo^€l Composed of Kedu ndan t
Com Ticnents with No Overlap. The nonredun-
dant aircraft model described above will now be expanded by
adding a second, separated engire, as shown in Figure 2. 17.
The second engine is assumed to have the same presented area
as the first engine, 50 ft^, tut its P^/^h is taken as 0.7
because of the presence of an additional accessory drive.
For the purpose of ccnparison, the aircraft's presented area
will remain 300 f t^ . The kill expression for this model
aircraft is:
Kill = (Pilot) .OE. (Fuel Tank) .OR. (2.28)
[ (Engine 1) .AND. (Engine 2) ]
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Table 7 presents the values fcr the vulnerability paraue-
ters. The Equation fcr the prchability of aircraft survival
given a random hit on the aircraft is:
P.,. = P..H ^ ^-" X [1 - {l^,^ X P^/^ )] (2.29)
P
S/H s/n^ ^ "^s/H^ ^ L' ^'k/h^i ^ Vh^2
vhich can te rewritter as:
Ps/H = O - Pk/H ) ^ (1 - Pk/Hf) X (2.30)
rr
f 1
- (fK/H,i =< Pk/H,, ) ]
TABLE 7











lUGl 60 ft2 0.3 18 ft2 .0600
Engine 1 50 ft2 0.6 30 ft2 . 1000
Ingine 2 50 ft2 0.7 35 ft2 . 1167
A =
p
300 ft2 \ = 22 ft2 ^K/H = .0733
Equation 2.30 says that the aircraft is killed if the pilot
is killed, or if the fuel tank is killed, or if both engines
are killed. Carrying out the multiplication indicated in
Equation 2.30 leads tc:
Vh = ' - '^k/Hp * Vhj ) * <-VHp ^ Pk/Hj) - (2.31)
^k/Hf 'J ^ ^k/Hgi " ^k/Hg2
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If the assumption is made that the single hit cannot kill
toth engines (recall the assumption that only the cdDpcnent
hit can te killed) , then all of the component kills are
mutually exclusive, and all of the products of the ccmpcnent
kill p ictatilities in Equation 2.31 are zero. Hence, the
aircraft is killed only if the pilot or the fuel tank is
killed, and the P^ ,„ and A,, are:K/ n V
^ K/H ^ ^k/Hp * \/Hf (2.32)
A = A + A (2.33)
P f
In general, only these componerts whose loss or damage can
cause a kill of the aircraft on a single hit will contribute
their vulnerable area to the total. If the single hit kills
only cne cf the redundant compcnents, the aircraft is not
killed, and hence, nothing is contributed to the vulnerable
area. Thus, the tctal vulnerable areas for this case is
just the sum of vulnerable areas for each of the nonredun-
dant critical components. Ccnparing Table 7 with Table 3
shows the single hit vulnerable area reduces from 52 ft^ to
22 ft2 due to the addition of the second engine. Thus,
redundancy can significantly reduce the vulnerable area of
the aircraft. On the other tand, if the damage to the
redundant component which is hit creates secondary damage
mechanisms or processes that propagate to another redundant
component and kills that component, causing a less of the
aircraft, the redundant comporents will contribute to the
aircraft vulnerable areas. For example, suppose the prob-
ability that a hit cc one of the engines will cause that
engine tc throw blades into, cr torch, or burn the other
engine is 0.1. Because this can happen regardless of the
engine hit, the component presented area becomes 50 + 50, cr
100 ft2, and the vulnerable area contributed by both engines
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is 10 ft2. Thus, this failure mode increases the aircraft
vulnerable area to 32 ft^.
{^) Aircraft ?lod€l Composed of Redundant
Com^cnents With Overlap. If redundant
components are now allowed to overlap one another, as shewn
ty the aircraft in Figure 2.18, the computation of the vuln-
erable area given by Equation 2.29 must be modified because
a single hit in the overlap region can kill both engines.
For this cas€, the cross hatched area
shown in Figure 2.18 is defined as the overlap area. A
single hit penetrating this area will have a probability of
killing hoth redundant components, and hence the aircraft.
!Ihus, it will be necessary to add the vulnerable area cf the
overlap region to that of the ronredundant critical compo-
nents. In essence, the overlap region becomes another crit-
ical component, as ic the nonredundant model with overlap.
The vulnerable area is computed in the same manner as
described previously; however, the details are slightly
different. The expression for P_/u given by Equation 2.20
must be Eodified. According to Equation 2.20, the prob-
ability that the aircraft survi-ses a hit on an overlap area
with Eo redundant components is given by:
P ,, = P X P X P^ X X P^ (2.31*)
s/h^ s^ S2 S3 s^
However, if there are two recundant components amcng the
components along the shotline, such as components number 2
and number 3, the prctability that both are killed, which is
assumed to cause an aircraft kill, is equal to the product
of their irdividual probabilities of kill, (P kAi2 ^ ^k/h3 )•
The probability that both compoEents are not killed, which
is required for aircraft survival, is the complement of
(Pk/h^ ^ Vh )' °^ n-(Vh2 ^ Pk/h^)]- Thus, (P^^ X P3^)
in Equation Z. 34 must be replaced with [1- (Pk/h? ^ Pk/h3 ) 1





= F X [ 1 - (P X F ) ] X X P (2.35)
's/h^ s^ k/h2 *k/h3 s
For our example, the jrobabilitj the aircraft will survive a
hit on the overlap region is gi\en by:




= 1 - [ 1-(P X P ) ] (2.37)
This procedure can be extended to the situation where there
are three or more redundant overlapping components or
multiple sets of overlapping redundant components.
The "elsewhere" or non-overlapping areas
of each of the redundant components are not used in the
vulnerable area computations fcr the same reason as that
used in the no overlap case. 2 single shotline through any
one of the redundant componerts outside of the overlap
region causes only a kill of that component, net of the
aircraft, and hence no contribution is made to the aircraft
vulnerable area. If the P „ values for the engines in thek/h
overlap region shown in Figure 2.18 are taken as 0.6 for the
first engine hit and 0.2 for the overlapped engine (the
overlapping engine slows the carnage mechanism down) , the
probability the aircraft will survive a hit on the overlap
region is given by Equation 2.36 and is equal to 0.88. The
probability of an aircraft kill given a hit in the overlap
region is given by Equation 2.3'/ and is equal to 0.12. If
the overlap area is assumed to be 10 ft2, the vulnerable
area increases to 23.2 ft^ due to the overlapping engines as
shown by the computation in Table 8.
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TABU 8
Redundant aircraft Mcdel With Overlap
Critical A x P, _ = A P, ,„
CcmFcnent Pj_ ^/^^
^i '^/"i
Eilct 4 ft2 1.0 4.0 ft2 .0133
Puel 60 ft2 0.3 18.0 ft2 .0600
Cverlap
Area 10 ft2 0.12 1.2 ft2 .0040
A = 300 ft2 A = 23.2 ft2 P = .0773
P V K/H
l. Multiple Hit Vulner ability
The analysis will now progress to the more
reasonable expectation that in any combat engagement, an
aircraft, if hit, will recei^je more than one hit. The
distribution of these hits over the aircraft is assumed to
be random, and all hits are assumed to travel along shot-
lines from the same direction- This latter assumption is
not reguired, but is taken for €ase of explanation.
The probability the ith component still survives
after n random hits ce the aircraft, denoted by p/./h- ' ^^
equal to the product of the comfonent survival probabilities
for each of the n hits on the aircraft. The superbar nota-
tion on P indicates the joint probability, and the super-
script E in parentheses indicates the hit number. Thus,
P^(n) = Pjl^ X P^%. X ... X P<;i. (2.38)
i
where Ps/h- ^^ 'the probability the ith component survives
the jth hit on the aircraft. The probability of survival of
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the ith component due to the jth hit on the aircraft is
equal to one minus tte probability of kill of the ith compo-
nent due to the jth hit on the aircraft. Thus,
Eecall that P, „, is assumed to be a constant value for allk/Hi
j. Thus, Equation 2.38 can be civen in the form:
Ps/H = n (1 - Kjl ) = [ 1 - Pk/Hi 1" (2.40)
j = 1 ^
^
The probability of survival of the aircraft
after n hits can be derived in a similar manner to give:
— (n) " (J)
where ^^'l^ is the probability of kill of the aircraft due to
the jth hit on the aircraft, ard may or may not be constant
for all j. The probability the aircraft is killed after n
hits, Pj^/H ' ^^ ^^^ ccnplement of Pg,^ , or:
(n) (n) n (-;)
Vh = ^ - ^s/h = '- n n ' ^k/h) (2.42)
j=l
In any multiple hit assessment, it is necessary
to keep in mind the distinction between the effect of
multiple hits on tte vulnerable area of a nocredundant
aircraft model as opposed to hits on a redundant aircraft
model. Multiple hits on a ncrredundant aircraft model do
not change the total vulnerable area and the P^,„ because ofK/H
the assumption that components are either fully functional
or killed. If a shot hits the aircraft, but not a critical
component, the vulnerable area and the P y./u i^^inain the same.
Cnly when a hit actually strikes the vulnerable area of a
nonredundant critical component is the aircraft killed.
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The redundant aircraft model has to be vieved
differently. If the redundant aircraft takes the first hit
in the vulnerable area of a redundant component, the
aircraft is not killed, but the aircraft vulnerable area and
the P will increase for the second hit because one of the
K/H
redundant components has been killed. For instance, if one
of two engines is killed on the first hit, the aircraft
vulnerable area is ucw increased by the vulnerable area of
the remaining engine because a kill of the remaining engine
on a subsequent hit causes an aircraft kill.
Three methods are presented below to shew the
effects cf multiple hits: The kill tree diagram, the state
transition matrix (or Markov chain) method, and a simplified
approach. The first method is more of an instructional
tocl, whereas the transition matrix method can be used in
complex problems beyond the practical capability of the kill
tree diagram. The simplified approach is the easiest to
use.
C) The Fill Tree Diagram. The sequence cf
events explained above regarding the effects of multiple
hits can be illustrated diagram natically using what is known
as a kill tree diagram. The probability of kill cf each
component given a random hit on the aircraft is first
computed using Equation 2.6, then the kill tree diagram is
created. To simplify the explanation, consider the nonre-
dundant aircraft model with no overlap illustrated in Figure
2.15 and defined in Table 3.
The Ki ll Tree Diagram, Nonredundant Model.
Figure 2.19 presents the kill tree diagram that defines the
mutually exclusive kill probabilities of each nonredundant
critical component (pilot, fuel, and engine), and hence the
aircraft, and the probability that no critical components
are killed after the first hit en the aircraft.
102
Figure 2. 19 First Hit Bonredundant Kill Tree
^
^k/Hf ' ^ = Vh, ' ^^<^ ^In Figure 2.19, P = P^^^ ,
represents the probatility that no critical components are
killed and is given bj N = 1-(P+F+E). Note that P+F+E+N is
unity; all possibilities hav€ been accounted for on this
first hit. The probability the aircraft is killed on this
first hit is given by P+F+E.
Figure 2. 20 represents the kill tree
diagram after the second hit. PxP represents the situation
where the first hit killed the pilot, and the second hit
also killed the pilot. It is important to note, however,
that once a probability of kill is defined for each critical
component on the first hit, that component is considered
killed at that probatility value for all subsequent hits.
The pilot cannot be killed twice. The four branches from
that kill probability for the second hit adds nothing new
(no additional probability of pilot kill) to the sequence.
This fact can be verified by examining the sum of the kill
probabilities PxP PxF PxE PxN, which is the same as
Px (P+F+E+N). Thus, this line is equal to the protatility
calculated for P on the first hit because P+F+E+N is unity.
The only addition to the kill probability of the aircraft
due to the second hit comes from critical components not
killed on the first hit. This concept will becone clearer
and mere important when redundart components are discussed.
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NxP NxF NxE NxN
IxP IxF PxE PxN ExP ExF ExE ExN
Figure 2.20 Second Hit lonredundant Kill Tree
In crder to illustrate the develcpment of
a kill tree diagram, assume the numerical values for the
component kill probabilities gi-ven in Table 3. Figure 2.21










Figure 2.21 First Hit Bonredundant Kill Tree Example
probability the aircraft is killed after the first hit is









- 0.1733 = 0.8267 (2.44)
Figure 2.22 extends this example to the
second hit. The prcbability the aircraft is killed after
the second hit is the sum of the additional kill probatili-
ties for each of the critical ccmponents for the second hit.
Thus,




S/H = 1 -
_(2)
^K/H = 1 - .3166 = .6834 (2.46)
F F E N
0133 .0600 .0100 .8267
Kill Kill KILL X / V
UxP KxF NxE NxN
01C99 .04S60 .08267 .68343
Kill Kill KILL
Figure 2.22 Second Hit Honredundant Kill Tree Example
The kill tree diagram procedure may be
continued indefinitely to determine Ps/h ^°^ ^^^ numter of
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hits. Hovever, the probability the nonredundant aircraft
model survives a sequence of hits can also be computed using
Iguation 2.41. For the nonredurdant aircraft model, Pwh ^^
constant as explained above. Thus, the probability the
aircraft survives two hits is given by:
- (2) (1) (2)
Ps/H = n - Pk/h) X (1 - Pk/h) = (1 - Pk/h)^ (2.47)
or,
- (2)
Ps/H = O - 0.1733)2 = 0,6834 (2.48)
!3ote that this value is the sane as that obtained frcn the
kill tree diagram, as it should be.
Equation 2-4 1 can be used for any number
of hits and is much easier to use than the kill tree
diagram. The essence of this equation is that all of the
nonredundant critical components can be combined into one
composite critical component whose vulnerable area is 52 ft^
and whose Pw^ is 0. 1733 in the numerical example,
Kill ^ree Eiaaram, Redundant Model.
Consider new the redundant aircraft model shown in Figure
2.17 and defined in Table 7. An evaluation for Fj,,^^ and
^s/H ^^^ ^® performed in a marner similar to the previous
discussion. Although the engines are redundant critical
components, each must be shown as a separate branch in the
kill tree diagram, because a kill of an engine is a possible
outcome of an aircraft hit; and any engine kill will have an
effect on the aircraft's vulnerability. Figure 2.23 illus-
trates the kill tree diagram fci the first hit. Note that N
now represents the probability that no nonredundant or
redundant component is killed.
The logical kill expression for this















Figure 2.23 First Hit Redandant Kill Tree Example
(Pilot) .OR. (Fuel Tank) .OR
[ (Engine 1) .AND. (Engine 2) ]
(2.^9)
Because the first hit cannot kill both engines, the prob-
ability that the aircraft is killed after the first hit is
just the sum of the kill prcbabilities for each of the
nonredundant critical components (pilot and fuel). Thus,
"^K/H " 0.0133 + 0.0600 = 0.0733 (2.50)
Figure 2.24 illustrates the event prob-
abilities on the second hit after a kill of engine 1 on the
first hit. The sequence represented by killing engine 1 on
the first hit and then killing the pilot (0.00133), or fuel
(0.06C0), or engine 2 (0.01167) on the second hit results in
additional aircraft iills. Thus, the cumulative probability
of an aircraft kill is due tc kills of the nonredundant
critical components as well as kills defined by component
redundancy restrictions. The five branches from a kill of
engine 2 and from the N branch will also contribute addi-
tional kills. Thus, after twc hits, the cumulative prob-






















Pigure 2.2U Second Hit After First Hit on Engine 1
-(2)
P
K/H = .0733 + [.10C0 X (.0132 + .0600 + .1167)] (2.51)
+ [.1167 X (.0133 4 .0600 + .1000)]




= 1 - 0. 1646 = 0.8354 (2.52)
Note the significant increase in survivability (0.8354
versus 0.6834) after the second hit due to the addition of
the second engine.
This procedure can be continued irdefi-
nitely, as in the nonredundant case, but it is obvious that
the ccmputations quickly become overwhelming in complexity.
The state transition matrix method described below is better
suited to handle the problem.
108
(2) The State Transition Matrix ilethgd (Markov
Chaic) . Briefly, the state transition
matrix method assumes that a sequence of independent events
(random hits on the aircraft) can be modelled as a Markov
process. In a Markov process, the aircraft is defined to
have two or more states in which it may reside, and the
probability of an aircraft kill due to the j+1 hit is the
probability that the j+1 hit or the aircraft will cause the
aircraft to transiticr from a ncn-kill state after j hits to
a kill state. The sequential process of evaluating the
probability the aircraft exists in each of the several
possible states after hits 1, 2, 3, ..., J is based upon the
probability the aircraft existed in each of the possible
states after hits 0, 1, 2, ..., J-l/ respectively, and is
referred tc as a Markov chain. Rather than dwell on the
mathenatical theory, an example using the previously defined
redundant aircraft model will serve much better tc illus-
trate the methodology.
An aircraft consisting of a pilot, a fuel
tank, and two engines can exist in five distinct states:
1. One or more of the nonredundant critical components
(the pilot and the fuel tark) have been killed,
resulting in an aircraft kill, denoted by Knrc.
2. Cnly engine 1 has been killed, denoted by Krcl.
3. Cnly engine 2 has been killed, denoted by Krc2.
4. Both engine 1 and engine 2 have been killed,
resulting in an aircraft kill, denoted by Krc.
5. None of the nonredundant critical components and
neither of the engines are killed, denoted by NK.
States Knrc and Krc are called absorbing states because the
aircraft cannot transition from these two kill states tc any
of the ether three non-kill states.
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A transition iratrix of probabilities, [I],
can now be constructed to specify how the aircraft will
transition from one state to aEother due to a hit ce the
aircraft. Table 9 illustrates the computation of the [T]
matrix for the example redundaEt aircraft model defined in
Table 7. Each element of the matrix represents the
TABLE 9




Knrc Krcl Krc2 Krc NK to this
state
300 4+18 4+18 4+18 Knrc
1 30+213 30 Krcl
30C 35+213 35 Krc2
35 30 300 Krc
1




No te that the sum
probability of transitioning from the state defined by the
column locations to the new state defined by the rcw loca-
tion. Ihe matrix is read as follows. The probability of
the aircraft transitioning frcn the Knrc state to the Knrc
state is unity (300/300) because Knrc is an absorbing state.
The probability of transitioni rg from the Krcl state (kill
of engine 1) to the Knrc state (kill of a nonreduEdant
component) is the sum of the conditional probabilities of
kill cf the two nonredundant conponents, that is, P+F. The
probability of transitioning frcm Krcl to Krcl (remaining in
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Krc1) is the sum of engine Vs probability of kill given a
hit on the aircraft. El, and that of the remaining "else-
where" area of the aircraft, N. Transitioning froir Krcl to
Krc2 is zero because a kill of the second engine after the
first engine is killed defines the state Krc. Thus, the
state transitions frcn Krcl to Krc according to the condi-
tional probability of kill of the second engine, E2, and so
on.
Let the prchability that the aircraft
exists in each of the five possible states after the jth hit







l^ote that the sum of the elements in [ S ] -" is always unity;
the aircraft must exist in one of these five states. The
probability the aircraft is in each one of the five states
after the (j+1) th hit is given ty:
(j+l) (j)[S] = [T] [S] ^ (2.53)
That is, the aircraft transitions from [S] -" to[S] -'^
according to [T].
An aircraft kill is defined by those
states that specify either a kill of any of the nonredundant
components or a kill of enough members of the sets of redun-
dant components, such as both engines. In this example,
Knrc and Krc specify the kill states. Hence, the prob-
ability the aircraft is killed after n hits is given by:








where Knrc and Krc are the probabilities the aircraft
is in these two states after n hits.
Using the lumbers generated in the
previcijs numerical example, consider the first hit. Prior
to the first hit, the aircraft is entirely in the NK state.




= [T] [S] (0) = [T]
NK








_0 . 7 1 0_
= 0. 0733 as before Similarly, for the second















Note that the sum of the elemerts of [S] is unity, as it
12)
should be. The [ S
J
vector results reveal that after the
second hit there is a 14.13 percent probability that either
the pilot or the fuel tank or bcth have been killed, a 15.20
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percent protability that engine 1 has been killed, a 17.93
percent probability that engin€ 2 has been killed, and a
50.4 1 percent probability that none of the critical compo-
nents have been killed. Thus, after the second hit:
P^^^ = 0.1413 + 0.C233 = 0.1646 (2.55)
K/H
This value is the sane as that obtained from the kill tree
diagram after the second hit, as it should be. This process
can easily be continued for as nany hits as desired. Figure
2.25 shows the P},' as a function of n for both the redun-K/n
dant aircraft model and the nonredundant aircraft itodel
given in Table 3. The differerce between the two curves is
the reduction in vulnerability due to redundancy.
In the above presentation, the transition
matrix was assumed to be the same for all hits. This
assumption is not necessary. If multiple damage mechanisms
hit the aircraft frcir several different aspects, a tran-
sition matrix can te constructed for each aspect of
interest. The computation of the state vector for the j+1
hit, given by Eguaticn 2.53, would use the transition matrix
for the approach direction of that particular hit. Another
possible modification is the ccrsideration of an increase in
P due to multiple hits. Again, [T] could be changed
K/Hi
from one hit to the next.
(3) A Siirplified Ax£roach. If the probability
of survival of each of the critical components after n hits
on the aircraft is known, an approximation for the prob-
ability the aircraft has been killed by the n hits can be
obtained by neglecting the mutually exclusive feature of the
individual component kills on acy one hit. Thus, for the
example redundant ccmponent aircraft model, Eguaticn 2.30
can be used. Eguaticn 2.30, for the n hit situation, is
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) (1-P )(1-(P ) (P )) (2.56)




) = a-u-p )n)(i_(i_p )nj (2.58)
according to Equation 2.U0. Table 10 presents the Pj^/h f°^
toth the transitioE matrix method and the simplified
approach for several values of e. Note that the approximate
^K/H -^^ toth lower than and hicher than the correct answer
and that the approximate kill probability is reasonably







A Comparison of Aircraft Kill Probabilities
1 3 5 10 20
.0733 .2615 .4456 .7619 .9640
K/H
.0833 .2693 .4436 .7470 .9567
JApproximate
]
(4) Multiple Hit Vulnerable A re a. The cumula-
tive probability of kill given n hits derived above is not
necessarily the best measure for assessing or comparing
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aircraft designs due to its dependence on the physical size
of the aircraft. If two aircraft have identical vulnerable
areas, hut different presented areas, the one with the
largest presented area will afpear to be less vulnerable
because its cumulative probability of kill given n hits will
be less than that of the aircraft with the smaller presented
area- Cn the other hand, being larger, it may suffer more
hits; that is, it may be more susceptible.
The measure that is the most ireaningful
for vulnerability assessment and comparison of designs is
vulnerable area. For nonredundant aircraft, the probability
cf kill given a hit and the vulnerable area are constant for
each and every hit. Each subsequent hit has just as much
chance of killing the aircraft as the previous hit (assuming
component degradation is neglected). However, this is not
true for aircraft with redundant critical components. For
these aircraft, the frobabilitj of kill given a hit and the
corresponding vulnerable area changes with each hit because
of the increasing possibility of the loss of one or mere of
the redundant components. In crder to compute the multiple
hit vulnerable area, an event-based probability cf kill
given a hit must be computed for each hit. In general, the
probability of aircraft survival after taking n hits was
given by Equation 2.41 which is:
which also can be expressed in the form:
-(n) (^(n-l) (i_-(n) (2.60)
"" f n ^
The value desired in Equation 2.60 is Pj^/jj , the event-based
probability that the aircraft is killed on the nth hit on
the aircraft given that it has survived the first (n-l)
hits. Eearranging terms in Equation 2.60 gives:
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(n) -(n) -(n-1) ^ ,.
Equation 2.61 can alsc be given in the form:
(n) — (n) —(n-1) .^ coa
1 _ p' ' = (1 - p' ) / .1 - P ) (2. 62)
K/H K/H K/H
and hence,
p(") = (p(") - p(>^-^^ / (1 - 5^"-^)- (2.63)
K/H K/H K/H K/H
Ihe vulnerable area fcr the nth hit. Ay , is computed using
the Pj,/pj given by Equation 2.63 and the basic vulnerable
area equation. Equation 2.1. Tlus,
A^"^ = (A ) (P^^^ (2.64)
V P K/H
(n)
Figure 2.26 shows the A., for the redun-
_(n) ^ (1)
dant model Pk/h given m Figure 2.25. Note that the Ay is
just the sum of the vulnerabl€ areas of the nonredundant
components. Note also the asymptotic behavior for the
redundant model. The constant vulnerable area of the nonre-
dundant aircraft given in Table 3 is also plotted in Figure
2.26 fcr the purpose cf comparison. Note that the vulner-
able area of the redundant aircraft is less than that of the
nonredundant aircraft (with the 30 ft^ vulnerable area
engine) for the first fifteen hits. On subsequent hits, the
vulnerable area is slightly larger due to the fact that
there is a strong likelihood that one or the other of the
two engines has been >:illed, atd the benefits of redundancy
have been eliminated.
c. Presentation of Results
Nonexplcsive projectile results normally will be
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compoEents for each combinatior of threat, kill category,
and striking aspect assessed with the striking velocity
varying from 500 to 3500 ft/sec. Manual assessments for
nonexplcsive projectiles will te performed for at least the
six majcr views of tie aircraft. A computerized assessment
will be performed fcr at least the six major views and
usually for a total of 26 views spread at 45 degree incre-
ments of elevation and azimuth as described earlier. A
typical total aircraft single hit vulnerable area summary
form is shown in Figure 2.27. Multiple hit vulnerable area
cur.ves similar to tie one showr in Figure 2.26 should also
be presented for at least six aspects.
In addition to the total aircraft A^ presenta-
tion, the vulnerable area of each critical component should
also be listed, and both the true and the incremental vuln-
erable areas should be presented for overlapping components.
Redundant components should be identified, and the number of
redundant components that must be killed to cause an
aircraft kill should be noted. The single hit vulnerable
area asscciated viith overlapping redundant components should
also be identified. Figure 2.28 shows a sample component
vulnerable area summary form.
For explosive projectiles and contact fuzed
missiles, vulnerability data normally will be presented as
summary forms of the total A^ of nonredundant components for
each combination of threat, kill category, and aspect angle
assessed. These results usually are not presented as
varying with the fragment striking velocity. Each major
redundant component will be shown separately if assessed.
Assessments will be performed for at least the six major
views and for 26 views if possihle. For HE projectiles, in
addition to the total aircraft vulnerable area, the contri-
bution ty subsystem or aircraft region should also be
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Figure 2.28 Sanple Component Vulnerable Area Fori
projectile, or in a sketch of the aircraft with regions
shown and the region's presented area and vulnerable area
summarized on an acccirpanying fcrm.
2 . Blast
Aircraft vulnerability to external blast is usually
expressed as an envelope about the aircraft where the deto-
nation of a specified charge weight of spherical uncased
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pentolite high explosive will r€sult in a specified level of
damage or kill to the aircraft. Detonation outside of such
an envelope will result in little or no damage to the
aircraft or in a lesser kill le-vel. The damage mechanism is
the hlast resulting from the detonation of the high explo-
sive in the vicinity of the aircraft. A spectrum of charge
weights are often specified for which the aircraft vulner-
ability measures are computed in the vulnerability assess-
ment. The specific charge weights selected are
representative of the expected threat warheads which might
he encountered. Envelopes are determined for a variety of
encounter conditions which account for variations in
aircraft speed and altitude, as well as aspect. Aircraft
critical components -vulnerable to the external blast consist
principally of portions of the airframe structure and
control surfaces. Threshold kill criteria for the critical
components are derived from structural and aerodynamic anal-
yses, Cnce the blast pressures and impulse levels required
for a conpcnent kill are determined for several locations on
the aircraft surface, a contour may be plotted corresponding
to the detonation distance and the weight of pentolite which
will picvide the required overpressure and impulse level.
Two different graphical presentations of the data may be
used. The first is a plot of charge weight versus distance
for a constant kill level. Several curves can be drawn on
the same graph, one for each altitude of interest. A
similar graph is required at each azimuth and elevation
angle of interest abcut the aircraft. Figure 2.29 is an
example of this type cf presentation. The second graphical
method, illustrated in Figure 2.30, is to construct iso-
charge weight contours about the aircraft for a given kill
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Figure 2.29 Typical External Blast
vulneratility uata Presentation
3- iB^Same Anal^^sis
The probability of an aircraft kill due to the burst
of a specific warhead for a particular set of encounter
conditions,
^k/d ' ^^ dependent upon how many fragments hit
the aircraft and the aircraft's vulnerability to the
multiple hits. The number of fragments which strike the
aircraft was derived in the previous chapter and the
aircraft's vulnerability to multiple hits was discussed in
the previous section. The Pj^/p, due to the n hits on the
aircraft is analogous to the Pk//i derived in this chapter
earlier. Thus,
^k/d ^^^ ^^ estimated using cumulative
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150 LB (68 1 KG)
100 LB (45.4 KG)
30 LB (13.5 KG)
20 LB (9.1 KG)
150 LB (68.1 KG
100 LB (45.4 KG)
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20LB( 9.1 KG)
Figure 2.30 Typical Externa] Blast K-Kill Contour for
Various Heights cf Uncased Pentolite at Sea Level
probatility of kill curves similar to the one shown in
Figure 2.25. Simplified equations for PK/D in terms of the
aircraft vulnerable area and the n hits are derived below.
The probability the aircraft is killed given the jth
-(n)
random hit by a single fragment, PK/H / can be determined
using the procedure described in this chapter. The prob-
ability that the aircraft is
random hits from detonation,
2.42. Therefore,
killed by the n independent,
is given by Equationp(n)
K/H '









^K/H^ = ^""P^'^^K/H^ (2.66)
j=l j=l
furthermcre^
n (j) ^ (j)
E P^;^ = ^ V / Ap (2.67)
j=l j=l
Hence, P^^,^ can be given in the form:
n
P^^^ = I - expl (^ p / n) I A^^S (2.68)
j = l
according to Equation 1.33. If there are no redundant crit-
ical ccmponents. Ay is usually assumed to be a constant
value for all hits, and Pj^/n sinplifies to:
P = 1 - exp(- p A ) (2. 69)K/D V
An example of the coaputation cf P for an encounter is^ ^ K/D
given in Table 1 1
.
Ihere is no unique value for Pk/d ^"^^ ^ warhead
detonation at a specific location with respect to the
aircraft. P , will be different for detonations at theK/D
same distance, but at different locations around the
aircraft. Nevertheless, the aircraft's vulnerability to an
externally detonating warhead is often indicated only with
respect to the distance of the detonation from the aircraft,
vithcut regard to the ether variables.
fi typical curve relating P
,
to the detonation
^ ^ ^ K/D
distance, R, is given in Figure 2.31. This curve is
referred to as the kill functicE given a detonation, and the
radius at which Pj^,j^ is equal to 0.5 is called the lethal
radius of the warhead. The value of Pj^/^^ specified for each




































An Example Comp ctation for P
^ '^ K/D
Static Warhead Spray angles, a^ = 50, cl^ = 120
Parameters
liumber of fragments, N = 1000
fragment velocity, V-^ = 7000 fps
Encounter Ifissile speed, V = 1500 fps
Parameters
tissile ancle, = 30
Detonation distance, E = 80 ft
Aircraft speed, Vt = 1000 fps
Aircraft Jiircraft presented length = 50 ft
Parameters
JSspect vulnerable area, A^ = 25 ft^
(to fragment size and striking
velocity nnder consideration)
Fragmentation '^-, = Tan--i[764U / 1515] - 30
Dynamic Spray
Angles <^2 = Tan-i[4250 / -5763] - 30
Eragment P = 1000 / [2 x x 8O2 x 1.059]
Spray Density
P = .0235 fragments/f t2
Probability Pi./^ = 1 - exp (-0.0235 x 25)
of kill ^ K/D
several different encounters at R, or the Pwd values could
be weighted with respect to the expected probability of
encounter occurrence in order tc obtain a weighted average.
For example, if a certain nissile only approaches the
aircraft from the rear aspect, only Pk/d values for that
type of encounter would be computed.
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I. 7D1NEEABILITY TO IBTERNALIY DETONATING HE WAEHEAES
Anti-aircraft projectiles 2Cmm and larger often have an
HE core with a contact fuze that detonates the warhead
either immediately or shortly after impacting the aircraft.
This results in a detonation on or inside the aircraft, with
the acccmpanying blast and fragment spray in many direc-
tions. The assumption of parallel trajectories or shotlines
through the aircraft used in the nonexplosive penetrator
vulnerability assessment is not valid in this situation.
Instead, the fragment shotlines emanate radially from the
location of the warhead burst point. The probability of
kill of any critical componen-ts that lie on any of the
radial fragment shotlines needs to be evaluated and the
aircraft's vulnerable area and probability of aircraft kill
given a hit computed.
There are several approaches to this problem. Cne
simple approach is to expand the presented area of each of
the critical components beyond the actual physical size of
the component, and then treat a hit by the HE round in the
expanded area in the same manner as that used for the
nonexplosive penetrator. For example, the presented area of
the pilot could be tie entire cockpit, because any hit and
detonation within the cockpit could kill the pilot. Figure
2.32 illustrates this approach. If the expanded areas of
two or more components intersect or overlap, the procedure
for accounting for overlapping components described above
must be used.
In another procedure, the ^(arhead detonation is assumed
to take place at individual locations within a grid superim-
posed on the presented area of the aircraft, as illustrated
in Figure 2.33. Each cell contains one randomly located
burst point. The probability of killing the aircraft is
























will t€ dependent upcn the relative location of the adjacent
critical components and on any shielding of these components
provided fcy intervening structure and non-critical compo-
nents. Critical ccmponents, or parts of critical compo-
nents, outside of the cell in which the burst occurs must
also te considered when they can be hit and killed by the
damage mechanisms. Note that several redundant critical
components can possibly be killed by the single HE burst.
The burst point kill probability is determined using the
kill expression for the aircraft. However, because mere
than one critical ccnponent can be killed given a single
burst, the individual component kills are not exclusive; a
single burst could kill both the fuel system and the pilot.
Thus, the approach used in the overlapping component Eodel
to compute V.,-. must also be used here. The probability of
an aircraft kill given a randcn hit from the attack aspect
under consideration is obtained by multiplying the prob-
ability of aircraft kill given a hit computed for each burst
point, i'T^/TT , by the probability of a random shot hittirg
the burst point area, P^ . The latter probability is given
by:
Ph = A^ / a , t = 1, 2, .,., B (2.70)
b P
where E is the number of burst points or cells considered,
and A is the local grid cell area around each burst point.
Note that even though critical components outside of the
cell are included in
^^/n , just the area of the cell itself
is used in the computation- The P^ ,„ for the aircraft given
K/ H
a random hit is giver by:
B B
p^^^, = r (P ) (P ) = A r (A ) (p ^ ) (2.71)K/H H^^ K/H^^ P b K/Hj^ '
b=l b=l
where A is the vulnerable area of the bth cell.
^b
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The aircraft vulnerable area is computed using:
B B
= E A,, (P.,,,, ) = E A^ (2.72)
b=l " b=l ^
which is the sum of the vulnerable area of the individual
cells
.
The vulnerable area for internally detonating HE
warheads is usually much larger than the vulnerable area for
nonexplcsive projectiles and fragments, but it can never
exceed the aircraft's presented area.
I.. 7DLN1BAEILITY TO lASERS
Because a laser beam must hit an aircraft to damage it,
and because no high explosive charge is involved, the meth-
cdolcgy for assessing the vulnerability of aircraft to
lasers consists of essentially the same procedure as used in
the assessment of aircraft vulnerability to the single
nonexplosive penetratcr.
laser vulnerability is particularly threat sensitive.
The first step of the assessment consists of developing a
description of the target. Fcreign intelligence data and
mirror technology are used to describe the target. From
this data a computerized targ€t description is generated,
allowing the critical components and their failure modes to
be identified. The second step of a laser vulnerability
study is to accumulate data on the energy density required
to produce failure of the critical components, and energy
density data on the barrier materials which shield the crit-
ical components. From this data, burn through times are
calculated as a function of laser beam intensity, power,
type of material, and thickness using a parametric penetra-
tion equation. A shotline program, using the computerized
target description, is used to determine the critical
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components and thid^ness of the shielding material which
Eust te penetrated along each shotline. For each laser
dwell time interval, energy is allowed to accumulate, and
the time it takes for critical component failure is
recorded. An aiming accuracy function is applied for each
shotline and the prohability of kill, given a laser locked
onto target, P . (tx / for each dwell time is calculated.
The general description of laser vulnerability assess-
ment described above applies orly to aircraft and ends with
P„,_ (t) . Laser vulnerability assessment of a missile is
K/ Lo
iTore complicated and takes intc account damage produced by
the laser to the missile's seeker/guidance system during its
trajectory so that the missile misses its target. It should
be noted that, for an air deferse weapon, the laser is not
effective in bad weather conditions where the relative
humidity is high.
G. CCMPUTER PROGRAMS FOR VULNEfABILITY ASSESSMEST
The determination of an aircraft's vulnerability can be
a complex and time consuming task. When done manually, many
simplifications and assumptions are made, the results are
subject to interpretation, and the output is usually limited
in sccfe. Conseguently, an extensive number of computer
programs or models have been developed by the U.S. military
and industry for assessing aircraft vulnerability. These
programs can be divided into four major categories; shot-
line generators, vulnerable area routines, internal burst
programs, and Endgame programs. Programs in the first two
categories are used for the peretrator and single fragment
damage mechanisms. Those in the third category are used for
internally detonating HE warheads, and those in the fourth
category are for the proximity fuzed HE warhead. (The
reader is cautioned that just because a computer is used.
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the results are not to be treated as sacrosanct. The output
is no mere valid than the assumptions that were used to
develop the model and the input data.)
Computerized techniques for vulnerability estimates for
nonexplcsive projectiles and single fragments are currently
in wide use. A prerequisite fcr performing such analyses is
the generation of a geometric model of the aircraft
describing all of the critical components and the lajor
structure and nonvulnerable components that provide
shielding for the critical components. The computer is then
prograirnied to project shotlines (parallel rays) through this
model, from selected viewing asjects to provide a sequential




These prograns generate shotline descriptions of
aircraft targets for use as input data to the codes which
calculate vulnerable area. The programs usually model the
aircraft external surface and the individual internal and
external components either with a set of geometric shapes or
with surface patches. The target geometric information
required to assess the vulnerability by computer program is
generated mathematically by superimposing a planar grid over
the target model and by passing a large number of parallel
rays through the target from the attack direction to the
ether side (normal to the grid) through individual grid
cells, as shown in Figure 2.34. The position and number of
rays is determined by means of the superimposed grid. The
number of rays is controlled bj selecting the size of the
individual squares of the grid. One shotline is randomly
located within each cell. Each ray-surface encounter is
listed sequentially aid identifies the ray location, surface






















encouEtered, and distance between internal surfaces. This
procedure is repeated for all shotlines originating frcni the
selected attack directions. Also the A of designated
P
components and of the overall target is output for each
viewing aspect. The A^ is approximated by multiplying the
number of rays intersecting the target by the area of the
individual cells making up the grid plane.
Two families of shotline generator routines have
teen developed. Thej are the MAGIC, GIFT family and the
SHOTGEN, FASTGEN fanily. The MAGIC and GIFT codes were
developed at the U.S. Army Ballistic Research Laboratory,
Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD . These codes use the combinato-
rial geometry approach, with basic body shapes such as
spheres, boxes, cylinders, ellipsoids, and cutting or
bounding planes, to describe components. GIFT is an
improved version of MAGIC, with simpler input requirements,
more efficient computation, acd computer-generated graphic
displays. The second family, SHOTGEN and the more recent
FASTGEN and FASTGEH II, is somewhat similar to the ether
family, but typically uses the flat triangular patch method
to describe the component surfaces. SHOTGEN was developed
by the Naval Weapons Center, ard FASTGEN and FASTGEN II are
improved versions of SHOTGEN sponsored by the Air Force
Aeronautical Systems Division (iiSD) . Figure 2.35 shows the
external view of a model built using the combinatorial geom-
etry approach, and Figures 2.36 and 2.37 show the external
view and some interral compcrents of a flat triangular
surface patch model, respectively.
2- jiilnerable Area Routines
These programs generate component and total aircraft
vulnerable area tables for a single penetrator or fragment.
The vulnerable area routines car be divided into two groups,



























































































approach to compute the vulnerable area, and the "sicpli-
fied" or evaluation routines which use simplified approaches
to determine the vulrerable area. The routines in the anal-
ysis group are usually used for problems requiring in-depth
studies. However, they have the potential for use in early
design studies in which only a limited amount of technical
descriptive data is available. The evaluation routines are
more appropriate for problems in which a cursory analysis is
desired.
a. Analysis routines
The programs VAREA, VAREA02, and COVARl belong
to the detailed group. Inputs to these programs include the
shotline descriptions of the target model generated by the
shotline programs, probability of kill given a hit data for
the individual components, empirical ballistic penetration
data, and weapon characteristics data. Component and
aircraft single hit vulnerable area data are output in
tabular form.
VAEEA is the oldest and least comprehensive cf
the three routines in this group. It was developed in 1965
by the Naval Weapons Center to conduct vulnerability anal-
yses cf systems subjected to fragmenting-type threats and
uses the THOR penetration equations to compute penetrator
mass and velocity decay due to penetration through the
components along the shotline. VAREA02, completed in 1973,
evolved from the VAEEA program. Its added capabilities
include a projectile penetration mode, an air gap fire
model, a redundant components nodel, and an option to use
the DEI penetration equations irstead of the THOR relations.
COVART (Computaticr of Vulnerable Area and
Repair Time) currently represents the state-of-the-art in
vulnerable area routines. It incorporates all cf the
features of the VAEEA02 program and the helicopter
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vulnerahle area routines from tte HART program and includes
a battle damage repair time model. The procedure used by
COVAET tc compute single hit vulnerable areas is essentially
the same as that described in this chapter for the single
nonexplosive penetratcr or fragnent. The component vulner-
able area of each cell is the product of the cell presented
area and the probability of conponent kill for the shctline
in that cell. The vulnerable area of each component is the
sum of the component vulnerable areas computed for each grid
cell whose shotline passes through the component. The total
aircraft vulnerable area is the sum of all of the cell vuln-
erable areas, considering onl^ the nonredundant critical
components and any redundant critical component overlap.
Both true and incremental vulnerable areas are available for
the overlapping components, redundant critical components
that do not lie along the same shotline do not contribute to
the aircraft vulnerability,
b. Evaluation Routines
The computer progran COMVAT is representative of
the routines which belong to the other group, the sin:plified
codes. These routines were developed to fulfill the need
for relatively quick methods fcr computing vulnerable area.
They are intended tc be used in situations when use of the
more sophisticated routines maj not be feasible or timely,
such as during early conceptual design studies. The sicpli-
fied routines are not as accurate as the detailed routines,
but they should reguire ccrsiderably less effort and
computer run time to use,
COMVAT was developed specifically to compute the
vulnerable areas of aircraft components to projectile
threats. It is based upon the same principles as the
detailed routines, but it does not use shotline descriptions
of the aircraft; instead, it computes component vulnerable
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areas on the basis of input data describing average
shieldirg conditions en the coiponents. The THOE penetra-
tion equations are used to model projectile velocity decay.
Secondary effects such as spalling, projectile yawing
motions, and projectile break-uf are ignored.
3- Internal Burst Pr ograms
Several programs for coirputing the vulnerability of
aircraft to internally detonating HE warheads have been
developed under the directicr of the Joint Technical
Coordinating Group for Munitions Effectiveness (JTCG/ME)
.
These programs are sometimes referred to as point burst
programs, and the test known program is the PCIHTEOFST
program. This program uses the second approach described in
the section on vulnerability to internally detonating HE
warheads which is the point burst approach.
'^ • Endgame Pro^ rams
The Endgame refers to the terminal events in an
encounter between an aircraft and an HE warhead with a prox-
imity fuze. Just how the warhead got to the vicinity of the
aircraft is irrelevant to the Zrdgame analysis. The Erdgame
events may include target detection by the fuze, and usually
do include the warhead detonation, blast propagation, and
fragment flyout, iipact, and penetration through the
aircraft. The numerical value for the P is then deter-
mined for the given set of enccunter conditions and warhead
and aircraft characteristics. This procedure is usually
repeated for many different sets of encounter conditions and
warhead detonation points, and P^/d -^^ established as a
function of the detonation distance. Four Endgame programs
currently in use are SESTEM II, SCAN, ATTACK, and BEFMCD or
MECA. A fifth program, SHAZAM, is nearing completion.
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a. SESTZM II
This program was developed in 1977 by the U.S.
Air Porce Aeronautical Systems Division to evaluate the
terminal effectiveness of missiles with nonnuclear blast and
fragmentation warheads against aerial targets. The P is
computed with respect to a direct hit, fragment damage, and
blast. The program has the capability to simulate several
fuzing options and a general terminal encounter geometry.
The fragment spray angles and density, and fragment average
mass, static velocity, cross-sectional area, and coefficient
of drag are input data. The target is represented as a
collection of shapes that are either single fragment vulner-
able, masking, or fuzing comjcnents. The external shapes
(wing, fuselage, etc.) are nodeled using ellipses, and
rectangular parallelpipeds are used for the internal compo-
nents, such as fuel tanks ano electronics. The vulner-
ability of the components is represented by vulnerable area
tables. The prograir can be used to generate iso-?j^,j-,
contours.
t. SCAN
SCAN was developed in 1976 under the supervision
cf the D.S. Navy Pacific Missile Test Center (PMTC) for the
Joint Technical Coordinatirg Group for Aircraft
Survivability (JTCG/AS) . The objective of SCAN is to
predict the probability that an aircraft will survive an
attack by a missile armed with a warhead. Aircraft kills
due tc direct hit, fragment damage, and blast are evaluated.
A few fuzing options are considered, as well as a general
terminal encounter geometry. The warhead is divided into
polar and radial zones and different fragment sizes, shapes,
and materials can be specified within each zone. The target
is modeled using the combinatorial geometry approach, and
component vulnerability to single fragments is expressed by:
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P = C + [C X Wass ] + [C X Velocity] (2.73)
k/h 1 ^ 2 3
vhere mass and velocity refer to the fragment mass and
velocity. The energy density ard area removal kill criteria
are also options for use with components such as major
structures. Each ccnponent is given a material and thick-
ness and is linked to a subsystem, system, or aircraft kill
ty a logical kill expression, thus allowing the considera-
tion of redundancy. SCAN also has graphics capabilities for
evaluation of the input geometric model and output fragment
impact data.
C. ATTACK
ATTACK is a Naval Weapons Center revision of an
Endgame methodology developed at the Naval Missile Center,
Point Mugu. The object of ATTSCK is to predict the ability
of a missile to detect and destroy an airborne target.
Direct hit, blast, and single fragment (component) , and
multiple fragment (structural) kills are considered, and a
general terminal encounter geometry is provided. The
warhead in ATTACK uses the concept of polar and radial frag-
ment spray zones and fragment weight classes. A large
number of fuze options are available. The program reguires
four target models, one for each type of damage, and one
fuze model for each ercounter. The components in the single
fragmert model are physically represented by spheres at
specified locations, and the vulnerability of each component
is ccEtained in vulnerable area tables that depend upon
aspect angle, fragment mass, and fragment impact velocity.
The nultiple fragment model uses a segmented cylindrical
target representation, and the vulnerability of each segment
is specified by a critical level of fragment energy density.
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a. REFMOD (WECA)
The REFJ1CD prograir, developed in 1981, was
intended tc be a reference model to be used for cciDputing
the effectiveness of externallj detonating weapons against
moving targets. (It was later renamed Modular Endgame
Computer Analysis or MECA) . The model was developed under
the ausfices of the JTCG/ME Anti-Air Missile Evaluation
Group. lEFMOD has been assecbled by incorporating methcdcl-
ogies frcm many other existing Endgame programs, including
some significant additional features that enable it tc work
with a wide variety cf vulneratility models and to evaluate
warhead-target combinations that were previously tco cumber-
some to assess. The warhead types considered include the
continuous rod, divergent fragaent spray, convergent frag-
ment spray, focused fragment controlled motion, and an
aimable warhead in which the fragment spray density is non-
uniform about the missile axis. Several fuze routines are
available, and the option exists for the specification cf
fuzing data from flight tests. The target model and vulner-
ability employed depend upon the damage mechanism selected.
These include direct hit, blast, fragment, and continuous
rod. Component vulnerability types for fragments include
both vulnerable area and a Py.,^ kill criterion that is a
function of mass, velocity, and density. For the vulnerable
area model, components can te described as spherical,
linear, cylindrical, cr planar in shape, and the ccmpcnent
vulnerable area tables generated by COVART can be used. The
^k/h vulnerability model employs cylindrical components, and
the ccnpcnent kill criterion is given by:
^2
„ ,„_. ... ,
^3
:/h
= C^ X (Mass) X (Velocity) (2.74)
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with lover and upper threshold values. By inputting
different values for Ci , C , and C^ , a variety of kill
criteria can be employed. For example, when C-^ = 0.5, C2 =
^, and 0^=2, the erergy density criterion is specified.
€. SHAZAH
This code was de^ieloped at the Air Force
Armament laboratory (AFATl/DLY) for the evaluation of air-
to-air Eissile effectiveness. The program sequentially
assesses the possibility the target aircraft is directly
impacted by the missile, the effect of blast overpressures
upon the target structures, and the cumulative effect of
warhead fragment impacts on the target structure and crit-
ical components. The size, shape, and position cf the
target tody and internal components are described by
discrete surfaces, ard each surface can be vulnerable to a
direct hit, to blast, or to fragments. The criteria used to
define the kill of each comporent/surf ace are supplied by
the user. The program utili2es as much of the aircraft
descriptions that are prepared for the SHOTGEN and "VAEEA
programs as is economically feasible. A sufficiently large
number of encounter conditions are assessed to generate a
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